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Summary 
 The central matter in this study is the cost and time performance of infrastructure 
projects. As response to poor cost performance,  public-private partnerships are introduced. 
Governmental organizations collaborate with the private sector in the provision of 
infrastructure. The idea behind this decision is that partnerships would result in more efficient 
infrastructure projects. The question is whether more integral public-private partnerships 
result in less cost and time overruns.  
 In order to examine this question, Dutch infrastructure projects are used as unit of 
analysis. On the matter of cost and time overruns, the Dutch sector is representative for the 
world population. The analysis is twofold. First, a cross case comparative analysis is used, to 
explore how less integral and more integral projects performed with regard to cost and time 
overrun. Those findings are used to select cases for further in-depth research. This in-depth 
research is conducted with use of semi-structured interviews and is combined with the cross 
case analysis to examine how the Dutch road construction projects performed and what 
explains this performance.  
 The conclusions are that the examined cases performed better than the benchmark. The 
average cost overrun is 11 percent. In comparison with the 18.6 percent cost overrun for road 
construction projects in the Netherlands realized before 2009, an average cost overrun of 11 
percent is relatively good. More integral projects performed better than the less integral 
projects. More integral projects have an average cost overrun of 8 percent and an average time 
underrun of 0,6 months. Less integral projects have an average cost overrun of 13 percent and 
an average time overrun of 11 months. Several explanations for cost and time overruns are 
derived from the in-depth case analysis. Interwoven procedures, technical complexity and 
additional wishes during the construction phase resulted in delay and budget demands.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem definition  
The maintenance and expansion of an intensive infrastructure network is rather costly. 
According to the World Economic Forum the yearly demand for infrastructure investment is 
3,7 trillion dollars each year, thanks to urbanization and economic growth (World Economic 
Forum, 2013). The investment in road infrastructure was 53,33 billion euros in the EU in 
2014, which is 64 percent of the total EU investments in transport infrastructure (European 
Environment Agency, 2016). Research on the cost performance of transportation 
infrastructure projects showed that cost overruns during infrastructure projects are not an 
exception. According to Flyvbjerg (2002) 86 percent of infrastructure projects were more 
expensive after realization than was estimated. The average cost overrun is 28 percent for 
infrastructure projects, what means that the actual costs were 28 percent higher than estimated 
at the moment of the decision to execute the project. Projects as the Channel Tunnel between 
Great Britain and France and HSL Zuid in the Netherlands are well known examples of cost 
and time overruns. The burning question: how is it possible that almost 9 out of 10 
infrastructure projects have cost overruns? How is it possible that governments still 
participate in projects while the actual costs are almost 30 percent higher than the initial 
reserved budget? How is it possible that projects need more time than estimated? 
Since those studies emerged, several countries introduced public-private partnerships. 
For instance, public-private partnerships emerged in OECD countries (OECD, 2012) and the 
United States (Garvin & Bosso, 2008). The motivation for public-private partnerships is to 
minimize cost escalations by providing infrastructure in cooperation with the market. The 
market is able to produce infrastructure more efficient. Efficiency is enhanced by integrating 
project stages, which traditionally are provided separately. Integration of design, finance, 
construction and maintenance is expected to result in more effective infrastructure provision 
(Hodge & Greve, 2013). Efficiency will be enhanced by a reduction of the transaction costs as 
a result of integrating the project stages. Another intended effect of public private partnership 
is reducing costs as a result of more competition between market parties. These two effects 
are primary reasons to introduce public private partnerships. Secondary advantages of public 
private partnerships are enhanced innovation, more equal risk distribution and cheaper capital 
thanks to private financing (Savas, 2000: 240).  However, does the introduction of public-
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private partnerships result in more cost efficient infrastructure provision? In other words, does 
the use of public-private partnerships result in less cost and time overrun of the project costs?  
For this study, projects from one country are used as unit of analysis. A deeper 
comparison between projects of multiple countries is difficult, seeing the fact that there is 
more differentiation on the confounding variables. With the selection of cases from one 
country it is possible to isolate many of the other determinants of overruns.  
In order to study the performance of public private partnerships in comparison with 
the traditional provision of infrastructure on cost performance, the road infrastructure sector in 
the Netherlands will be studied. According to Cantarelli e.a (2012c: 328), the Dutch road 
construction sector is representative for the world population of infrastructure projects in the 
field of cost performance. 500 international road projects have an average overrun of 19,9 
percent and 37 Dutch cases have an average overrun of 18,8 percent. Moreover, in the 
Netherlands two forms of public private partnership are used in the same period: the least 
integrated Design and Construct (D&C) contract type and the more integrated contract type: 
the Design-Build-Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contract. This gives the possibility to make a 
reliable comparison of the contract types on the degree of integrality in the same period.  
Seeing the abovementioned statements, the central research question is: How do more 
integral public-private partnerships (DBFM) perform with regard to cost and time overruns 
compared with less integral public-private partnerships (D&C) in the road construction 
sector?  
 
1.2 Background 
The Netherlands follow the same EU trend in respect to urbanization and economic 
growth. Especially in urbanized regions traffic intensities increased (Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2017).  New investments in transportation infrastructures were 
necessary. The result was a set of megaprojects in order to improve mobility in urbanized 
regions. The Dutch government invested in the infrastructure fund varying from 5 to 5,5 
billion each year.
 1
 The goal was to provide new infrastructure in an efficient way. However, 
projects as the ‘Noord-Zuidlijn’ and the ‘HSL Zuid’ resulted in large cost and time overruns.   
The cost overruns resulted in the appointment of a special commission to investigate 
new forms of infrastructure provision: the Commission Ruding (Commissie Private 
                                                 
1
 Kamerstukken II  2014–2015, 34 000 A, nr. 1; Kamerstukken II  2015–2016, 34 300 A, nr. 1; Kamerstukken II  2016–2017, 
34 550 A, nr. 1.  
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Financiering van Infrastructuur, 2008: 15). One of the underlying reasons to give the 
Commission Ruding this task, was the publication of Flyvbjerg’s research to cost 
underestimations for infrastructure projects. The recommendations of the Commission Ruding 
were to re-intensify the use of public-private partnerships with private financing. The 
motivations for private financing are faster realization of infrastructure projects, higher 
quality at low costs – i.e. value for money – and more projects that can be realized 
(Commissie Private Financiering van Infrastructuur, 2008: 16). Resuming: a more efficient 
method for realizing infrastructure projects. 
The advice of the Commission Ruding is adopted by the Dutch government. The 
Ministry of Traffic and Water Management and the executive agency Rijkswaterstaat 
cooperate more closely with market parties in the designing, construction, financing and 
maintenance of Dutch roads with more integral contracts (Ministerie van Financiën, 2012). 
The partnership with the private sector is shaped in new contract types. The Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain-contract (DBFM) is the most integral contract type used in the Netherlands.  
Since the report of the commission Ruding, five road construction projects are realized 
with such DBFM contracts. Another seven road construction projects are in the preparation or 
realization phase (Ministerie van Financiën, 2016: 29). The question is whether this new type 
of public-private partnership results in less cost overruns, as this was the goal of the 
introduction of DBFM contracts.  
 
1.3 Justification 
1.3.1 Societal relevance  
Public-private partnerships gained popularity in the recent years. Especially in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries USA, Australia and the UK. Public private partnerships are mainly 
used in the infrastructure sector and the public housing sector. For decision makers it is of 
interest how public-private partnerships perform, as this is now common practice. Public-
private partnerships are introduced in order to increase cost efficiency in the infrastructure 
sector. This study examines whether those new partnerships lead to more efficiency and what 
the explanations behind the cost and time performance is.  
Moreover, with this study the reliability of project budgets is evaluated. Previous 
studies concluded that the budgeting process of infrastructure projects is unreliable, due to 
their high cost and time overruns (Flyvbjerg, 2002)(Cantarelli e.a., 2012a). This study 
examines whether the introduction of public-private partnerships resulted in less overruns. 
Less cost and time overruns will result in more reliable governmental budgeting. Reliable  
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government budgeting is desirable. When project costs overrun, budget reserved for other 
government’s tasks will come in danger.  
1.3.2 Scientific relevance 
This study is scientific relevant, since it is the first study that combines the 
development of infrastructure costs on different degrees of integrality. Flyvbjerg (2002) was a 
pioneer in the field of research of infrastructure costs development, as his research has an 
inductive design. Many studies followed and came to similar conclusions. For instance, 
Cantarelli e.a. (2012a) did similar research for Dutch infrastructure projects. However, both 
studies did not take into account the public-private partnerships with integral contract types. 
As public-private partnerships gained popularity in the public domain, public-private 
partnerships gained popularity in the scientific field as well. The studies have a primary focus 
on the tendering process or the decision making (Hueskes e.a., 2016: 92). However, a study 
on financial performance of infrastructure public-private partnerships with variance on 
integrality has not been conducted so far. This study will examine how efficient public-private 
partnerships are as an organizational form and what the effects of public-private partnerships 
are on the provision of infrastructure.  
Moreover, this study will examine whether the principal-agent theory has explanatory 
value in the field of client vis-a-vis/-contractor relations within the Dutch infrastructure 
sector. The enlarged scope of the principal-agent theory on the field of organizational theory 
is debated. According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory is compatible with many more 
relationships within organizations and between organizations.  
 
1.4 Structure 
 The remainder of this study is structured as follows: chapter 2 presents the theories 
about cost and time overruns, theory about public-private partnerships and the principal-agent 
theory. In chapter 3 the research design, case selection and data collection are described. 
Chapter 4 contains the analysis on cost and time overruns and the within case analysis of the 
different projects. In chapter 5 the central research question will be answered and the 
academic and practical implications are discussed.   
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2. Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
 For this study three theoretical models will be used. Firstly, the theories on cost and 
time overruns are explored and described. These theories are the heart of this study and 
created most expectations about the outcomes of the study. Secondly, the concepts from the 
public-private partnership framework are described in order to conceptualize public-private 
partnerships and form expectations about the effect of integrality. Thirdly, the development of 
the principal-agent theory as governance theory and its implications for the client/contractor 
relation in the infrastructure sector is discussed. Finally, the expectations are bundled in 
hypotheses which are leading in the empirical research. 
 
2.2 Theories on cost and time overrun 
 In the field of large governmental projects there is plenty of empirical research done 
about cost and time overruns and cost estimations. To narrow the theoretical scope, the focus 
is on studies about transportation infrastructure projects and specifically road construction 
projects. Firstly, the different studies about cost overrun will be discussed. Thereafter, the 
explanations for the cost overrun will be given. The explanations are of special interest, 
because it creates expectations for future infrastructure projects. In the last subparagraph the 
theories on time overrun are discussed.  
2.2.1 Empirical research on cost overrun 
Nijkamp and Ubbels (1998) have done a comparative case study on cost estimations 
for eight Dutch and Finnish road projects. Their conclusion is that for all investigated cases 
costs are underestimated. Cost underestimation occurs over different project phases. The 
explanations for overrun are project extensions, price rises and incomplete estimations. One 
of the conclusions was that cost underestimations are result of project adjustments during the 
administrative process (Nijkamp and Ubbels, 1998: 20). Nijkamp and Ubbels did not correct 
for inflation, because they saw inflation as a sole influence on cost overruns. 
Flyvbjerg did several studies about budget overrun and cost estimation for 
transportation infrastructure projects worldwide. He researched how common budgets for 
infrastructure projects did overrun (Flyvbjerg, 2002). Flyvbjerg was concerned with the 
explanations behind cost overrun as well (Flyvbjerg, 2004). His research is the first research 
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which contains projects over a time period of 70 years. Flyvbjerg created a sample with 167  
road projects, 58 rail projects and 33 fixed link projects – i.e. bridges and tunnels –. From a 
sample of 258 projects, 86% of the projects are realized with higher actual costs than was 
estimated. Road construction projects in Europe have an average overrun of 22.4% 
(Flyvbjerg, 2002: 285).  
The study is presented as groundbreaking. However, the amount of cases is limited. 
The population of 258 projects are dispersed over 70 years and over five continents. During 
this period, much more projects were realized worldwide. This raises questions about his data 
collection. According to Flyvbjerg (2004, 293) it is a consequence of the data availability. 
Flyvbjerg started with 343 cases, but 85 cases are excluded as the data was insufficient. 
However, how Flyvbjerg selected 343 cases is not mentioned clearly in his research. 
Therefore, there are reservations made about the generalizability of the 258 cases in the study. 
Cantarelli e.a. (2012b) did research for the Dutch infrastructure sector. Her Dutch 
dataset has become part of the Flyvbjerg dataset. Her research design is comparable to 
Flyvbjerg’s. Cantarelli concluded that cost underestimation occurs in the Netherlands as well. 
37 road construction projects have an average overrun of 18.6 percent (Cantarelli e.a., 2012b: 
90). The sample consists of projects that are completed between 1991 and 2009. This research 
did not include data from DBFM-projects. 
Cost deviations during the pre-construction phase and the construction phase differ 
strongly (Cantarelli e.a., 2012b: 91). For the construction phase cost underruns are more 
common than cost overruns. Cost overruns are mainly caused in the pre-construction phase. 
The average cost overruns in the Netherlands are comparable with cost overruns worldwide. 
Cantarelli compared Dutch results on cost escalation with average cost overruns for road 
construction projects in the rest of the world. The Dutch data is compared with the extended 
Flyvbjerg-database. The 37 road construction projects have an average cost overrun of 18.6 
percent compared with 21.2 percent for 278 road construction projects in North West Europe 
(Cantarelli e.a., 2012c: 328). The Netherlands perform better than neighboring countries. 
However, 222 road construction projects outside North West Europa have smaller escalations, 
namely average 18.2 percent overrun (Cantarelli e.a., 2012c: 329).  
Cost overruns during road construction projects appeared consequent over time and 
appeared worldwide. Besides abovementioned studies, more research is done on this subject. 
The frequency of overruns differs from 52 to 95 percent with an average overrun differing 
from 5 to 26 percent (Merewitz, 1973)(Bordat e.a., 2006)(Odeck, 2004)(Lee, 2008). It is 
striking that all studies on cost overrun have more or less the same conclusions.  
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2.2.2 Explanations cost overrun 
Cost overrun is from all times and did not decrease or increase over time, as the 
empirical evidence from many studies proved. The question is what the explanation is for the 
cost overruns. Flyvbjerg (2002: 14) proves that  there is no technical explanation for the cost 
underestimation possible. If the estimation techniques were so poor, they would have been 
improved over time. Another possible explanation could be more of a psychological nature 
(Flyvbjerg, 2002: 17). Politicians together with the engineers can have a ‘monument 
complex’. Appraisal optimism could result in cost underestimation (Mackie and Preston, 
1998). However, 70 years of unintentional optimism would be unlikely.  
Deliberate underestimation is more likely. So the cost underestimation is best 
explainable as a political game (Flyvbjerg: 2002: 19). Project costs are knowingly 
underestimated to acquire parliamentary approval and mislead the public. Once the project is 
started, in most cases it is inefficient to cancel the project when higher costs emerge. The 
project is locked in and path dependence is created.  
According to Wachs (1990) political influence in forecasting project costs is 
unavoidable. Cost estimation is a mathematical process, but forecasters need to make 
assumptions about the future. There is always a certain subjectivity in the forecasts, what 
gives the forecaster discretion to predict future project costs. This discretionary space could 
be used by political actors to create optimistic forecasts and mislead the public. 
Underestimating the costs in the pre-construction phase is a result of a political 
process around infrastructure projects (Nijkamp and Ubbels, 1998: 7). Nijkamp and Ubbels 
(1998) have three explanations for higher actual costs. The two most influential causes are 
price-index raises and project extensions. Interesting is the finding that for six out of eight 
projects count that the projects are extended over time, which resulted in higher costs. Project 
extensions count for the political explanation of underestimation, because extensions are 
result of a political strategy. Once the project scope is set and approved by the parliament, 
adjustments can be made by demand from local governments or national politics. In all six 
cases the project extensions result in higher costs. Political actors wait with additional wishes 
after the budget is already reserved for the project, since it is more likely that additional 
wishes will be approved later in the process. Nijkamp & Ubbels’ conclusion confirms 
Flyvbjerg’s theory on the political explanation of cost overruns. 
Explanations deducted from the abovementioned studies tell us that cost overruns have 
a political explanation. Project costs are deliberately underestimated to obtain the permission 
to execute the project. If the political actors would start with the high costs at the beginning, 
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there is a higher chance that the project will not be executed at all. Once the project started, 
the costs overrun. Cancelling the project is more expensive than proceeding with higher costs. 
When the project is finished, the actual costs are higher than the estimated costs. Improving 
cost estimation techniques are not helpful for resolving the problem of cost escalations. From 
the empirical results we could expect that deliberate underestimating of project costs will 
continue, unless the political process around infrastructure projects changes.   
2.2.3 Theories on time overrun 
Several studies are conducted about time overrun in the construction sector. Most 
studies focused on projects of one specific country. Most common determinants in the 
construction industry are: delays due to approval time of drawings, delayed payments, design 
changes, slow decision making of the client, design error and problems with labor shortages 
and skills (Ahmed e.a., 2002)(Al-Moumani, 2000)(Chan and Kumarawamy, 1995). Those 
studies have a great geographical variance. Abovementioned studies agree on the notion that 
it is more common that construction projects are realized beyond schedule than projects are 
realized on schedule.  
Kaliba e.a. (2009) studied the road construction sector in particular. Major causes of 
delay in Zambian road construction projects were delayed payments, financial processes and 
financial difficulties. With a weighted average occurrence of respectively 75, 67 and 60 
percent, these causes were most common. Other determinants of delay were poor supervisors, 
change in specifications, changes is drawings and construction mistakes. The causes of delay 
have different responsible actors. The three most common delays were the responsibility of 
the client. A more recent study focused on road construction projects in Palestina (Mahamid 
e.a., 2012). Two of the five main determinants of time overruns were result of the political 
situation in Palestine. Three other determinants were awarding projects to lowest bid price by 
the client, payment delay of the client and shortage of equipment (Mahamid e.a., 2012: 310).  
Around 75 percent of the projects experienced a time overrun of 10 to 30 percent and around 
25 percent of the projects had a time overrun of 30 to 50 percent.  
On the notion of time overrun during construction projects, most academic work 
reveals that projects beyond schedule are more common than projects on schedule. Time 
overrun for road construction projects is considered as normal.  
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2.3 Public-Private Partnership  
The framework of public private partnerships provides the tools for the partnership 
between government and the private sector. Public-private partnerships are designed to cope 
with the principal-agent problems which occur with traditional tendering processes, which 
create the traditional client-contractor relation during the realization of a project. The 
traditional tendering process emphasizes separate interests of governmental organizations and 
constructors. The client contractor relationship creates information problems. The idea with 
public-private partnerships is that the relation between the private executor and the 
governmental coordinator is more in synchronicity. First, the scientific debate about the 
definition of public private partnerships is discussed. Second, two forms of public-private 
partnerships with different contract types will be described. Finally, traditional contracting is 
briefly explained, in order to show the differences with the public-private partnerships.  
2.3.1 Definition of public private partnerships 
 There has been debate over the definition of public private partnerships. Hodge and 
Greve (2017: 70) conclude that the definition differs within five dimensions: project level, 
organizational form, policy of private sector role, governance tool, context and culture. For 
this study public private partnerships are considered as organizational form. At this level a 
public private partnership “is viewed as a specific type of infrastructure delivery mechanism 
with specific institutional and financial architecture in place to initially fund and deliver 
construction works as well as operate a long-term facility”(Hodge & Greve, 2017: 58). 
Central for this dimension is the emphasis on private financing and integration of several 
project components for the organization form. This dimension is central in project finance 
evaluations. The promises from governments on this dimension are better performance in the 
field of cost control and time management (Hodge & Greve, 2013). 
There are several forms of partnership with different degrees of integrality (Savas, 
2000 : 132). The degree of integrality depends on the amount of project phases that are 
integrated within one contract with a private party. The project phases are: designing, 
building, financing, maintaining, operating and owning. With the least integrated partnership, 
the private party is only contracted for the building of the infrastructure.  
2.3.2 Partnership based on DBFM contracts 
One of the partnerships in this study, is a partnership based on a Design-Build-
Finance-Maintain (DBFM) contract (Rijkswaterstaat, 2011). With this contract type the 
government pays a market party for designing, financing, building and maintaining of a 
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infrastructure project. The private consortium takes responsibility for all these aspects 
together. In the literature the DBFM-contract is often called in one sentence with Build-
Transfer-Operate or Design-Build-Finance-Operate partnerships (Savas, 2000: 243)(Delmon, 
2010: 12). The Dutch DBFM-contracts do not contain operations, because the operations 
remain a public matter (Chao-Duivis, 2011). With DBFM-projects the private consortium will 
receive availability payments for the performance during the construction and maintenance 
phase. The process of operating and tendering changes radically, because the government 
pays for a service and not a product, the service is an available road.   
The risk of high maintenance costs due to poor quality of the infrastructure is for the 
same consortium that constructed the project. DBFM is the most integral form of partnership 
between government and private parties in the Netherlands within the infrastructure sector. 
Another form of partnership is DBM. The finance part is left out and is a responsibility of the 
government itself. This intermediate partnership is not commonly used in the Netherlands. 
The Maintain-component in these contracts could be seen as a kind of guarantee period.  
Projects with integral contracts contribute to a more sustainable approach of 
infrastructure construction, because of the linkage of the project stages (Lenferink e.a., 2012). 
The lifecycle of the infrastructure will be optimized, because one consortium is responsible 
for design, construction and maintenance. It is considered that a private consortium will make 
more sustainable choices in the construction process in order to improve the maintenance 
process.  
2.3.3 Partnership based on D&C contracts 
The least integral form of partnership is based on Design and Construct contracts. The 
name could have been DB contracts, because the private party is responsible for the designing 
and building of the infrastructure project. Financing is done by the government itself. The 
advantage from this contract type is the integration of designing and constructing. One 
consortium is responsible for both parts, what reduces transaction costs. This reduction will 
enhance efficiency. Since 2008 D&C contracts are the standard contract type for road 
construction projects in the Netherlands (Rijkswaterstaat, 2008: 20).  
2.3.4 Traditional contracting 
With the traditional form of infrastructure provision, governmental organizations are 
responsible for designing and financing. A private party is only hired for the construction part 
of the projects. This is considered the traditional way of infrastructure provision, because it 
was the standard in the infrastructure sector. The government and the construction companies 
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have separate interests. Besides, double work creates inefficiency, because the governmental 
organization makes a detailed design and the contractor has to interpret the design. The 
traditional contracts are used in the Netherlands under the name RAW-bestek. The client 
creates a comprehensive design with detailed requirements. For projects with a budget higher 
than 100 million euros this contract type is no longer used by Rijkswaterstaat since 2007. 
 
2.4 Principal-Agent Theory  
 The principal-agent theory is the underlying theory for public-private partnerships and 
the use of integral contracts for infrastructure projects. The principal-agent problems and the 
solutions provided by the agency theorists are the base for integral contracts. First, the 
different agency theory streams are discussed and the stream that is most applicable to the 
public-private partnership framework will be further elaborated. In the second and third 
subparagraph the agency problems, moral hazard and adverse selection, are discussed. 
Finally, the resolving of agency problems is discussed.  
2.4.1 Variants Agency theory 
The principal-agent theory is a theory derived from the agency theorists. The agency 
theory has two general streams: the positivist stream and the principal-agent stream (Jensen, 
1983). The positivist stream concentrates on the relationship between shareholders and the 
executive branch within a company (Berle and Means, 1932). The scope of the positivist 
stream is narrow and specified on business economics. However, the positivist stream 
identified contract alternatives for resolving the principal-agent problems. The definition of 
outcome and behavior based contracts is created by the positivist stream (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
The principal-agent stream is more versatile. However, there is theoretical discussion 
about the applicability of the principal-agent theory. According to Perrow (1986) the 
principal-agent theory is not applicable to organizational theory. Formal principal-agent 
theory is abstract and not easy to understand. That is the main reason why formal principal-
agent theory is less attractive for social scientists. However the main assumptions are 
comparable with existing organizational theory and the solutions for the principal-agent 
problems are useful for organizational purposes (Eisenhardt, 1989: 60). Moreover, the 
principal-agent relation is applicable to many relationships (Harris en Raviv, 1978: 20). The 
principal-agent theory has explanatory value for the relationship between client and 
contractor.  
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The principal-agent theory discusses the problems that could occur when the agent 
does not work in the principal’s interest (Mitnick, 1992: 76). The goal of principal-agent 
theory is to design the optimal contract to reduce problems caused by information asymmetry, 
like moral hazard and adverse selection. Information asymmetry occurs when the agent has 
more information about the work he does than the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989: 61). 
Information asymmetry is a consequence of the client contractor relation. A contractor has 
more experience in his work field than a client, otherwise a client does not need to hire a 
contractor. Information asymmetry could lead to moral hazard and adverse selection.  
2.4.2 Adverse selection 
During the selection of the agent, the principal estimates the abilities of the agent. 
Agents have an information lead about their own abilities, because the agent knows best what 
his capabilities are. For the principal it is hard to estimate the capabilities of the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 61). This information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection. There is a 
chance that the principal selects an insufficiently qualified agent. The agent can misrepresent 
his abilities to create work for itself. Once the principal has selected the unqualified agent, the 
agent fails to supply what is contracted. This is a possible selection problem which is called 
adverse selection.  
Adverse selection could occur in inter-organizational context as well. The executive 
organization could misrepresent his abilities. Once the governmental organization has 
contracted the private party which fails to comply with the obligations from the contract, a 
problem occurs. This situation is undesirable, as the contractor is not able to provide the 
infrastructure project as decided upon. The result is project delays, low quality of the products 
or insufficient budget. With the traditional tendering, the risks of adverse selection of those 
obligations are for the government.  
2.4.3 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is a result of information asymmetry and is considered as an agency 
problem. The principal has an information backlog, so the agent has the possibility to follow 
its self-interest. Krugman (2008: 63) gives another comprehensive definition: “Any situation 
in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else 
bears the cost if things go badly”.  
The mechanism behind moral hazard in governance context is that an executive 
organization can follow its self-interest, because the responsible governmental organization is 
not fully aware of what the executor does. In a client contractor relation it is likely that the 
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contractor will follow its self-interest, because of conflicting interests. The contractor has 
interest of profit maximizing, work guarantee for the future and the use of cheap materials. 
Those interest could result in low quality, creation of extra work and time overrun, because 
the contractor only follows his own interest. That situation is not desirable for governmental 
organizations, because as a client, the government has the interest of high quality and 
sustainable infrastructure network. When the contractor follows his own interests, the risks of 
his decisions are for the government.  
2.4.4 Resolving agency problems  
 A solution to cope with moral hazard and adverse selection is investing in information 
about the agent’s behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989: 61). The contract between the principal and 
agent is based on behavioral measurements. This could be in de form of administrative 
procedures, extra layers of governance and input measurements. Gathering information is a 
costly way of resolving agency problems. The client within the infrastructure sector could 
invest in information systems to examine the abilities of the contractor before signing the 
contract. For repetitive work this information is available at relatively low cost. A contractor’s 
past experience is a rather reliable guarantee for the future. However, with large and 
complicated infrastructure projects it is harder to examine a contractor’s abilities, because the 
project is unique. For new elements it is hard to measure abilities in advance. Moreover, with 
large infrastructure projects the contracting party works with several subcontractors. It would 
be costly to invest in ex ante information for all subcontractors.  
Another solution of moral hazard and adverse selection is outcome-based contracting. 
The agent will be compensated for the result of its work. With this way of contracting, the 
interests of the principal and agent come more in synchronicity, because the contractor is 
motivated to create a high quality infrastructure project. The behavior during the task is not 
measured, only the outcome is measured ex post. Requisition for this type of contracting is the 
measurability of the outcome (Anderson, 1985). Another requisition for contracting outcomes 
is low outcome uncertainty. Distributing risks to the agent with high outcome uncertainty will 
be rather costly (Eisenhardt, 1989: 61).  
With outcome based contracts, the behavior of the contractor is of minor interest, what 
entails that the way a infrastructure project is realized is for the contractor’s interest and the 
contractor bears most risks for his behavior. The client pays for the obtained outcome. 
Measuring the outcome afterwards is important. The reward will depend on this measure.  
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Table 1: Contract types based on outcome certainty and outcome measuring 
2.4.5 Risk distribution 
 With transferring more risk to the agent, the principal has to pay a premium. The 
height of the premium depends on the risk-aversion of the agent. A risk-averse agent will ask 
a higher premium for bearing the risks of an investment (Harris and Raviv, 1979). With this 
notion in mind, outcome based contracts will be more expensive. The higher price of the 
contract is not problematic as long as the risk aversion of the agent is smaller than the 
principal’s risk aversion and as long as the premium for the risk aversion is smaller than the 
possible harm of the behavior based contract.  
 
2.5 Summary and hypotheses   
According to the agency theorists, public-private partnerships will perform better than 
traditional projects. As organization form public-private partnerships will result in less cost 
overruns for the government, since traditional problems as moral hazard and adverse selection 
will be resolved with new contracts. The contracts will only have effect in the tendering and 
contracting phase, because from that moment on, there is an division made on contract type. 
The expectation is that more integral contracts will result in less cost overruns. This 
expectation is captured in the first hypothesis.  
- Hypothesis 1: Public-private partnerships will have less cost overruns than projects 
with traditional tendering processes.  
 
The theories on public-private partnerships claim that more integral partnerships will 
lead to more efficient ways of providing infrastructure. This would mean that more integral 
contracts have less cost and time overruns than less integral projects. During the planning 
study phase the decision is made for the integrality of the partnership. The expectation is that 
more integral projects will be more efficient with budget during this project phases. 
- Hypothesis 2: Projects with more integral public-private partnerships will have less 
cost overruns during the planning study and construction phase than projects with less 
integral public-private partnerships.  
 
Which contract type? Outcome uncertainty high Outcome uncertainty low 
Outcome meas. impossible Behavior based contracts Behavior/Outcome based 
Outcome meas. possible Behavior/Outcome based  Outcome based contracts 
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 The third hypothesis focusses on the cost overruns during the political/administrative 
phase. The question is if the cost performance during this phases will differ for the different 
contract forms. The expectation is that integrality of partnership has no impact on the cost 
overruns during the political/administrative phase.  
- Hypothesis 3: Projects with more integral public-private partnerships will have equal 
cost overruns during the political/administrative phase as projects with less integral 
public-private partnerships.  
 
Theories on time overrun proved that time overrun is common with road construction 
projects. However, theories on public-private partnerships expect that more integral projects 
will be more economical with construction time.  The fourth hypothesis focusses on the time 
overrun of the projects. The addition of the finance-component will create more pressure 
within the consortium to finish the project on time. The expectation is that more integral 
projects will be more efficient with the construction time.  
- Hypothesis 4: Projects with more integral public-private partnerships will have less 
time overrun during the construction phase than projects with less integral public-
private partnerships.  
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3. Research Design and Data 
Collection 
3.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter the methodological approach is explained.  Firstly, the research method 
is justified and its application is discussed. Thereafter, the case selection is motivated and 
different groups of cases are explained. Thirdly, the variables are operationalized to measure 
the cost and time overruns. Finally, the data sources for both the cross case analysis and the 
within-case analysis are described.   
 
3.2 Research Method 
3.2.1 Justification  
The research has a qualitative design. It is combination of a cross case design with an 
in-depth case study design. This method is called a small-N comparative case design. 
Toshkov (2016: 258) describes it as a hybrid form of research. It combines the in-depth 
elements of within-case analysis with the comparative elements of multiple cases from 
quantitative designs. The advantage of this combination is the use of cross case comparisons 
to select relevant cases for a more deeper analysis with an in-depth case study design. The 
combination of both designs results is a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms 
behind cost and time overruns for the selected population. 
The disadvantage of this method is the limited external validity. The quantity of 
realized DBFM projects in the Netherlands is limited. Therefore, a quantitative design is not 
possible. Generalization to other countries is not possible, because only associations are 
discovered. In order to prove causal effects, more cases are necessary. However, a 
quantitative research design has no attention for specific mechanisms of cost and time 
overruns. To find out the explanation behind the cost performance deeper analysis is 
necessary and needed to examine whether the use of public-private partnerships result in a 
different process of infrastructure provision.  
 Small-N comparative research designs are useful for theory testing and to come up 
with new ideas for existing theories (Toshkov, 2016: 266). With that characteristics this 
research method matches with the goals of this study. Existing theories of cost and time 
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overrun and the principal-agent theory are tested and extended with newest insights about 
public-private partnerships. 
3.2.2 Research method applied 
 First, cost and time overruns are examined with a cross case analysis. The financial 
data and data about the construction period are collected and analyzed. With this analysis 
trends in overruns are identified and could be used to steer the within-case analysis. The 
small-N comparative design is based upon a complex most similar systems design. With this 
design three groups of cases are compared. This means that the cases are selected on the main 
explanatory variable (Toshkov, 2016: 264). The main explanatory variable for this study is the 
public private partnership’s degree of integrality. More specification of the cases is created 
with the use of moderating variables, so that possible cross case associations can be found. 
From the cross case analysis typical and deviant cases are selected for further within-case 
analysis.  
Table 2: Schematic representation of most similar systems design 
Secondly, the within-case analysis examines the deeper understanding of the cost and 
time overruns for specific projects. Interviews with involved governmental project team 
members are the basis of the within-case analysis complemented with financial project 
documentation. The interview data result in a deeper understanding of the mechanisms behind 
cost and time overruns. The method for the within case analysis is theory testing process-
tracing (Pedersen and Beach, 2013: 11). Process-tracing is a “mode of doing case study 
research in the focus on causal mechanisms” (Toshkov, 2016: 298). At the heart of process-
tracing is “concatentation” (Waldner, 2012: 68). Concatenation is defining a causal chain 
within a case by defining a series of events which are linked together. An extensive 
description of the causal chain is desirable. For infrastructure projects this means that the 
mechanisms behind the cost and time overruns are described in detail. In order to maximize 
objectivity, causal claims by the interviewees are confirmed by documentation about the 
Variable Treatment Group Control Group Reference group 
Degree of integrality 
(X) 
Most integrated Least integrated Least integrated 
Period of opening Opening after 2012 Opening after 2012 Opening before 2012 
Type of 
infrastructure project 
Road construction Road construction Road construction 
Country Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands 
Project budget 100M> 100M> 100M> 
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projects. For the study of infrastructure projects two directions are of interest. First, the 
specific motivation and project approach of the interviewees. Each project has a different 
project team, a different environment and different contractor to work with. Second, the 
provision of infrastructure has a specific institutional context, which differs per country. It is 
necessary to describe the institutional context in order to understand the process of road 
construction projects. Combined with the cross case analysis, a hybrid model is created and 
theories on cost and time overruns and the principal-agent theory can be tested.  
 
3.3 Case Selection 
3.3.1 Motivation case selection 
The unit of analysis is road construction projects in the Netherlands. As mentioned in 
the introduction, the cases are selected from the infrastructure sector of one country. The 
choice for this method has two motivations. First, with the choice for cases from one country, 
the causal interference of moderating variables is limited. With cases from different countries, 
the decision making process, economic circumstances, usage of contract types and 
environmental complexities differ. It is hard to control for those variables. Second, comparing 
more countries in depth, has practical limitations. It is time consuming to gather 
comprehensive project information from more countries. 
The Netherlands is chosen, because it is representative for the international 
infrastructure sector (Cantarelli e.a., 2012c: 328). The amount of cost overruns is comparable 
with the international database. Moreover in the Netherlands two contract types are used, with 
variance on the level of integrality. Both contract-types are used simultaneously, what makes 
comparison possible. For this study, road construction projects will be selected on the main 
explanatory variable: the degree of integrality. The most integral contract type is the DBFM-
contract. The expectation is that cost overruns are moderate for those projects. The group 
consists of five projects realized after 2012 (see section 3.2.2).  
In the same period, the contract type D&C is used for comparable projects. Those 
D&C projects have comparable complexity, size and geographic distribution. D&C projects 
with a budget under 100 million euros are dropped in order to create a group with comparable 
projects. The D&C-projects have the lowest degree of integrality. The contract type D&C is 
also used for projects realized before 2012. In order to control for general tendencies on the 
field of cost estimations and to control for economic influences, D&C projects realized before 
2012 are used as a reference point (see section 3.3.4). The group of D&C-projects realized 
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after 2012 is part of the research population. Projects with D&C contracts realized after 2012 
form the group cases with least integral projects (see section 3.3.3).    
3.3.2 Cases with most integral projects  
Firstly, seven realized DBFM-projects are selected. Two cases are rejected, because 
those projects are realized before 2009. Those two cases were outdated and sort of pilots. The 
data is for these projects was unreliable. The five remaining cases are realized in 2012 or 
later. The construction budget of those cases is 100 million or more. The construction budgets 
are the estimated costs at the formal decision to build. The selected cases:  
Table 3: Oversight of most integral projects 
Project   Construction budget (in million euros) 
A15 Maasvlakte Vaanplein ±1.060 
A12 Lunetten Veenendaal ±380  
A12 Ede Grijsoord ±120  
A10 Amsterdam 2
nd
 Coentunnel ±1.070 
N33 Assen Zuidbroek ±140 
3.3.3 Cases with least integral projects  
The group cases with least integral projects consists of projects with a construction 
budget of 100 million or more. In order to make a reliable comparison, all cases with a 
construction budget under 100 million are rejected. Remaining: relevant road construction 
projects realized after 2012 with D&C contracts:   
Table 4: Oversight of least integral projects 
Project   Construction budget (in million euros) 
A4 Dinteloord Bergen op Zoom ±200 
A4 Delft Schiedam ±640  
A2 Maastricht Passage ±630 
A10/A1 Knp. Amstel Knp. Diemen ±170 
A4  Burgerveen Leiden ±560 
N31 Leeuwarden Leeuwarden ±235 
A9 Badhoevedorp Omlegging ±300 
A50 Ewijk  Valburg ±250 
N61 Hoek Schoondijke ±100 
N35 Zwolle Almelo ±145 
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3.3.4 Reference group 
To examine whether the level of cost overruns of the more integral public-private 
partnerships and less integral public-private partnerships is result of exogenous tendencies, 
the reference group is set up. Exogenous tendencies could be economic fluctuations or more 
emphasis on cost control in general. The results of the study conducted by Cantarelli e.a. 
(2012b) is used as reference group. The average cost overrun according to the study is 18,6 
percent for road construction projects. The quantity of cost overruns for road construction 
projects is 62.2 percent, which means that 62.2 percent of the projects have a cost overrun.  
3.3.4 Case selection for interviews 
 For the interviews, the population of cases is reduced. The reference group is excluded 
from the population, because those cases are outdated. The experiences of the respondents are 
not fresh in memory and will pollute the data. The projects in the treatment and control group 
are realized after 2012, thus the projects are completed no more than five years ago. The 
respondents are contract managers, project managers and project controllers of the projects 
from the control and treatment group. Their experiences from projects five years ago are 
considered as sufficiently callable. Because of the limited quantity of cases and to enhance 
validity, managers from all cases are selected. For four cases the managers did not participate. 
Those four cases are equally distributed on the variables complexity, contract type, project 
size and average cost overrun. This means that sufficient cases are selected for the within-case 
analysis. The selection resulted in a total of ten interviews for eleven projects. A detailed 
overview can be found in the table of Appendix 3. 
 
3.4 Operationalization  
3.4.1 Variables 
The independent variable is integrality, what results in more or less integral public-
private partnerships. The cases are selected on the independent variable. Degree of integrality 
is measurable by examining the contract that is used for the infrastructure project.  Projects 
where the different project stages are integrated in one contract are more integral. Projects 
where the stages are separated and executed with different contracts are less integral. The 
degree of integrality is a ordinal scale from 1 to 6. This scale is chosen to indicate the distance 
between the different contract types.  
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 The least integral is the RAW-bestek, because the market party is only contracted for 
the construction of the project. The most integral is DBFMO. This contract is not used for 
infrastructure projects in the Netherlands, because operations remain a public matter.  
Table 5: Oversight of variable integrality 
Degree of 
integrality 
Contract type Project phases 
1 RAW- bestek Construction 
2 D&C Design, construction 
3 DB (Msmall) Design, construction, few years maintenance  
4 DBM Design, construction, maintenance  
5 DBFM Design, construction, finance, maintenance 
6 DBFMO Design, construction, finance, maintenance, operations 
 
The dependent variable is cost overrun. Cost overrun is the difference between the 
estimation of the project budget at the time of decision to build and the actual project costs 
after realization. The decision to build is the formal decision to execute the project. With this 
decision, budget is reserved for the execution of the project. In paragraph 3.4.4 the project 
phases are elaborated more in detail. The measuring of cost overruns is explained in 
paragraph 3.4.3 
3.4.2 Moderating variables 
 The projects evaluated in this research can vary on other factors.  The first variation is 
on level of complexity. Complexity is mostly examined in usage of bridges, viaducts and 
tunnels. Flyvbjerg (2002) uses bridges and tunnels as separate group (fixed link projects). 
However, this strategy could not be applied to Dutch projects, because bridges, viaducts and 
tunnels are incorporated in the road projects. The level of complexity will be measured on the 
relative amount of civil works in a projects and the use of new technical standards. A crucial 
factor in the technical complexity is the uniqueness of the technical parts within the project. 
When a bridge, tunnel or aqueduct is unique, the measure of technical complexity increases. 
Moreover, the complexity of the direct environment could be a moderating variable as well. 
In urbanized regions the project planning is more complex that in rural regions.  
 The projects vary in size. The budgets of infrastructure projects vary from 100 million 
to 1,5 billion euros. To compare the cases on size, the projects are classified in two categories. 
The first category is project budgets of 100 to 500 million. The second category contains 
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cases varying from 500 million or more. This selection is made on the actual project budgets. 
This variable is a possible moderating variable. These moderating variables are used to 
examine if there is different association between cost and time overruns and those variables.  
3.4.3 Measuring cost and time overrun  
The method of measuring cost overrun used by Flyvbjerg (2004: 281) is a comparison 
of the estimated costs at the time of formal decision to build with the actual costs of a project. 
The rationale behind this method is that when the formal decision to build is made, the project 
scope and budget reserved and confirmed by the competent minister. Once the decision is 
made the Parliament must be able to rely on the estimations, because the project budget is set 
apart in the governmental budget. Any overrun or underrun in the project budget means a 
deviation in the governmental budget. Cantarelli e.a. (2012b: 89) follows the same method of 
measuring cost overruns. With this method of measuring cost overruns, only the first and the 
last measuring points are relevant. Both Flyvbjerg and Cantarelli control for inflation. This 
study will follow that line and controls for inflation. The projects get a yearly correction for 
inflation called index van bruto overheidsinvesteringen (IBOI) (CPB, 2011).This is an 
inflation measure for all governmental investments. The project budgets are corrected with the 
awarded IBOI-amounts.  
Nijkamp and Ubbels (1998: 5-6) use a method of measuring cost overruns with more 
measuring points. The different phases are conceptualized and used in the study, including the 
preliminary study phase and the study phase. These extra measuring points are not that useful, 
because the formal decision to execute the project is not made. On the other hand, measuring 
points for the tendering phase and the start of the construction phase are useful, because 
tendering results and cost deviations during the construction phase show the development of 
overruns or underruns in the project budget. With this extra measuring points, the 
development of the cost overruns will be insightful. 
 For the cost overruns, the construction budgets are compared. For D&C projects the 
total project costs count as the construction budget. However, for DBFM projects the 
maintenance and finance component are included in the project budget. In order to make a 
valid comparison, the total project budget is reduced with the finance and maintenance 
components. 
 The measurement of time overrun focusses on the construction phase. The estimated 
opening of the road will be compared with the actual opening of the road. The time of 
estimation is the moment the tendering starts. From that moment, the deadline for opening is 
formalized. 
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3.4.4 Project phases 
A Dutch road construction project has eight phases (Rijkswaterstaat, 2014). The eight 
phases will be reduced to three phases, because those phases contain a relevant measuring 
point. These measurement moments will be used in the analysis to make a decent evaluation 
of the estimated costs and the realized costs. The most important phases are the first phase, 
the end of the plan study and the third phase, the project completion. All activities between 
those phases will determine the cost performance.  
The first phase is the initiation and exploration phase. This is the political phase and 
takes place in the political-administrative domain. The Ministry of Infrastructure is 
responsible for this phase. During this phase the infrastructure problem is determined. The 
first rough cost estimation will take place during this phase, before interest groups or local 
governments can affect it. Thereafter, the responsible minister consults with local 
governments to guarantee budget for the project. This consultation results in a formal decision 
to build. This decision is marked by an administrative covenant or a minister’s decision. The 
administrative covenant is result of a political/administrative process with decentral 
governments to determine the national and regional contributions to the project. With an 
administrative covenants both national and regional governments promise their contribution 
to the infrastructure project. When the regional governments take no part in the decision 
making and only a national contribution is made, the minister of infrastructure makes a 
decision to execute the project. Both the administrative covenant as the minister’s decision are 
comparable with ‘Decision to Build’ used by Flyvbjerg (2002: 281). The minister makes the 
decision to execute the project. The budget is guaranteed and the formal decision to execute 
the project is made. This is the first measurement point. 
The second phase is the planning study phase. During this stage the solutions for the 
infrastructure problem are elaborated and consulted with the public. After this consultation, 
the minister takes a final decision on what the solution for a infrastructure problem is. The 
minister takes a 'tracébesluit’ (route decision). For a few weeks the route decision is open for 
objection. After the objection period the decision will be irrevocable. With the route decision, 
the scope of the project is determined. With the final scope the margin of certainty of the 
project budget increases. This process is mainly for local residents and local companies to 
contest for possible losses. Because the scope is determined with this decision, this is called 
the scope decision. Another part of the planning study phase is the tendering process. Mostly, 
the tendering process parallels the route decision process. During the tendering process 
several private consortia enroll for the tender and create a specific design for the project. 
 30 
Rijkswaterstaat chooses the best option. When the decision is made, the contract amount is 
available and the contract type can be chosen. Possible positive or negative tendering results 
result in decreases or increases of the project budget. This is the first measurement point for 
the time overruns, because the contractor and Rijkswaterstaat committed to an opening date.  
The third phase is the construction phase. During this phase the contractor realizes the 
infrastructure project. At the end of this phase the project is completed. After completion, the 
construction period is determined and the actual costs of the project are available. During the 
construction period, the contractor and Rijkswaterstaat could request amendments to the 
contract or unforeseen changes could occur to the project, which are for the account of the 
contractor or Rijkswaterstaat.  
Table 6: Oversight of project phases, the decision making during the phases and the measuring points 
Project phases Decision making Measuring point 
Phase 1: Initiation 
and exploration 
Administrative decision to execute 
the project with matching budget 
reservations.  
Budget reservations during 
the Go-decision. 
Phase 2: Planning 
study 
Determining of the project scope with 
the scope decision and the contract 
with the contractor. 
Project budget after scope 
decision with tendering 
result. 
Phase 3: 
Construction 
The project is executed by the 
contractor. Contract changes could 
occur. 
Actual project costs are 
available at the moment the 
project is opened. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of the decision making process of road construction projects 
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3.5 Data collection 
3.5.1 Financial data  
The financial data about the project budgets will be acquired from the MIRT-project 
overview and documentations of the Dutch Infrastructure Fund. The Dutch infrastructure 
department conducts a yearly project overview with all infrastructure projects which is called 
the ‘Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport’ (literally translated: 
multiannual program infrastructure, spatial planning and transport). This documentation 
contains all road, water and rail projects planned in the Netherlands. The project overview is 
part of the yearly budgeting moment in September.  
 The governmental budget is yearly conducted by the ministry of finance. One of the 
appendixes is the Budget of the Infrastructure Fund. All national road construction projects 
are financed from the infrastructure fund in the Netherlands. The ministry of infrastructure is 
responsible for the Budget of the Infrastructure Fund. The project budgets of D&C-projects 
disappear from the Infrastructure Fund Budget and the MIRT-project overview when the 
project is realized. Project budgets of DBFM-projects are retained in the Infrastructure Fund 
Budget and the MIRT-project overview, because availability fees are paid out for the duration 
of the contract. For each project the development of the project budget is processed in a 
database. From this database comparisons are made. 
 Information on the project budget during the first project phase is received from the 
administrative covenants or the minister’s decision to execute the project. Documentation 
about this decision results in clear budget reservations for the project. The sources of the data 
are publicly available. Additional information about project budgets is received from 
interviews with governmental contract, project managers, project controllers and cost experts. 
The interviews are a secondary source for the composition of the project budgets. The primary 
sources are the abovementioned Infrastructure Fund Budget and the MIRT-project overview. 
   
3.5.2 Dates of measuring points 
The information about the dates of the measuring points is received from several 
sources. Data about the first measuring point is received from the administrative covenants or 
minister’s decision itself. In most cases, the financial data and the date of measuring 
corresponds. In some cases the data about this measuring point is not available on the exact 
date of measuring. When that situation occurs, the first cost estimation after the measuring 
point is chosen.  
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 The measuring poins of the second phase is an intermediate measuring points. The 
measuring point is the scope decision. The date of the scope decision is obtained from the 
scope decision itself. In most cases, the changes after contestation are minor. In these cases 
the moment of route decision will be the measuring point. In case the contestation results in a 
cancellation of the route decision, a revision of the route decision is necessary. Than the 
revision of the route decision will be the measuring point.  
 The last measuring point is the end of the construction phase. This point is marked by 
the opening of the project. This date is obtained from internal documentation of 
Rijkswaterstaat and from interviews.  
3.5.3 Institutional context 
Information about the institutional context for the provision of road construction 
projects is obtained from publicly available documentation and interviews with informants 
working for Rijkswaterstaat. Details of the interviews about the institutional context can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
3.5.4 Specified project information 
 Specified information about the projects is obtained from interviews with contract 
managers, project controllers and project managers. This information is primarily collected 
with interviews. The interviews are recorded and transcribed. The interview consisted of a 
written part, with some basic questions and an semi-structured oral part. The written part is 
attached in Appendix 1.  
 The respondents are contacted on varying criteria. Firstly, the contract managers, 
project managers and project controllers of all projects are selected. Dutch road infrastructure 
projects are managed according to the principles of Systems Engineering. The Dutch 
government provides five managers: the project manager, contract manager, project 
controller, environment manager and a technical manager. These five managers form the 
project team from governmental side. The environment manager is focused on the regional 
stakeholders to manage the contacts with the region. The technical manager is focused on the 
technical matters of the project. Those managers do not have enough knowledge about the 
relation with the contractor with regard to cost development and partnership. The project 
manager, project controller and the contract manager have more experience with the 
development of the project costs and the relation with the private consortium.  
 Secondly, the three different managers are selected for each project within the 
population. The persons on the positions within each project change over time. The second 
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criterion is that the managers were active during the realization phase and that the active 
period was at least the half of the realization phase of the project. All managers that match 
those criteria are contacted.  
 Most of the contacted managers did participate in the interviewing process. Some 
managers did not react to the interview request or did not have sufficient time to participate. 
Once a manager complied to the interview, he or she received a declaration of participation. 
Once they signed the declaration, they gave informed consent to participate.  
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
 To answer the research question, two types of analysis are used. Firstly, a cross-case 
analysis is conducted, in order to reveal trends in cost and time overruns. Secondly, a within-
case analysis will deepen out the mechanisms behind cost and time overrun. Finally, in the 
last part of the analysis results of both analyses are combined to make a comprehensive cross 
case analysis of time and cost overruns.    
  
4.2 Results cross-case analysis 
 For each project the budget reservations at the formal decision to build are compared 
with the actual project costs after realization. These comparisons result in a percentage of cost 
overrun/underrun of the project costs. The intermediate measuring point will be incorporated 
to show the development of the project budget. First, the results of all projects is compared 
with the benchmark in order to test hypothesis 1. In the second and third subparagraph the 
results for the group with more integral projects and the results for the group with less integral 
projects is presented. In the fourth subparagraph both groups are compared in order to test 
hypothesis 2, 3 and 4. 
4.2.1 Comparison with reference group  
 Research by Cantarelli e.a. (2012b) has shown that road construction projects in the 
Netherlands have an average cost overrun of 18.6 percent. The number of projects with cost 
overruns is 62.2 percent. Both groups in this study perform better than this benchmark. For 
the less integral projects four of the ten projects have a larger cost overrun than 18.6 percent. 
For the more integral projects one of the five projects perform worse than the 18.6 percent 
benchmark. The average overrun for all projects of the research population is 11 percent. The 
quantity of cost overruns is 60%, which means that 6 out of 10 projects have cost overruns.  
 Public-private partnerships perform on average better than the projects examined by 
Cantarelli. Hypothesis 1 (Public-private partnerships will have less cost overruns than 
projects with traditional tendering processes) is confirmed.  
4.2.2 Cost and time overrun more integral projects  
 The average cost overrun for DBFM projects realized after 2012 is 8 percent. This 
means that the actual project costs after realization are 8 percent higher than was estimated 
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and reserved at the formal decision to build. Two of the five projects with more integral 
contracts show a cost underrun. The deviations between the projects is limited. More integral 
projects perform relatively good on time overrun with a time underrun on average.  
Table 7: Oversight of most integral projects with cost and time overrun 
Project   Cost overrun Time overrun 
A15 Maasvlakte Vaanplein 23% 6 months 
A12 Lunetten Veenendaal -4% -6 months 
A12 Ede Grijsoord -13% -6 months 
A10/A5 Amsterdam 2
nd
 Coentunnel 14% 3 months 
N33 Assen Zuidbroek 18% 0 months 
Total   8% -0.6 months 
4.2.3 Cost and time overrun less integral projects 
 The average cost overrun for D&C projects realized after 2012 is 13 percent. This 
means that the actual project costs after realization are 13 percent higher than was estimated 
and reserved at the formal decision to build. The project N35 Zwolle Almelo has a 77 percent 
overrun, what results in relatively high cost overrun for the group with less integral projects. 
However, there is no reason to reject the case, because the data for this project is reliable. The 
average time overrun for this group of cases is 11 months, which is relatively high compared 
to the group with more integral projects.  
Table 8: Oversight of least integral projects with cost and time overrun 
Project   Cost overrun Time overrun 
A4 Dinteloord Bergen op Zoom 21% 11 months 
A4 Delft Schiedam 1% 0 months 
A2 Maastricht Passage 31% 0 months 
A10/A1 Amstel Diemen -24% 7.5 months 
A4  Burgerveen Leiden -7% 38 months 
N31 Leeuwarden Leeuwarden 20% 0 months 
A9 Badhoevedorp Omlegging 1% -6 months 
A50 Ewijk  Valburg 2% 36 months 
N61 Hoek Schoondijke 8% 3 months 
N35 Zwolle Almelo 77% 20 months 
Total   13% 11 months 
4.2.4 Comparison on contract type 
 In the comparison between the groups with more integral projects and less integral 
projects, the relatively better performance of the group with more integral projects is 
interesting. The use of more integral contracts results in more efficient infrastructure 
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provision for the examined projects. In table 9 a specification of the cost overruns divided 
over the different project phases is presented.   
Table 9: Oversight of cost overrun over different project phases 
During the construction phase, the less integral projects perform differently from the 
more integral projects. The less integral projects have an average cost overrun of eight 
percent, where more integral projects had an average underrun of two percent. The examined 
DBFM projects tend to be more efficient during the realization phase than the examined D&C 
projects. Hypothesis 2 (Projects with more integral public-private partnerships will have less 
cost overruns during the planning study and construction phase than projects with less 
integral public-private partnerships) is confirmed, since the average cost overrun for more 
integral projects is lower than the average cost overrun for less integral projects.  
For more integral project the large part of the cost overruns occurred between the 
decision to build and the scope decision, namely ten percent. For less integral projects, the 
cost overrun during this period was five percent. The difference between more integral and 
less integral projects is small, but the cost overruns are not equal as was expected. Hypothesis 
3 (Projects with more integral public-private partnerships will have equal cost overruns 
during the political/administrative phase as projects with less integral public-private 
partnerships) is rejected. A possible explanation for the relatively higher cost overruns for 
more integral projects during the political/administrative phase is earlier implementation of 
additional wishes from the stakeholders, because it is harder to change the scope of a DBFM 
project after the contract is signed. This possible mechanism is elaborated in the within case 
analysis (paragraph 4.3).  
 Both groups differed on time overruns as well. The difference on construction time 
between more integral and less integral projects is almost a year. More integral projects have 
a time underrun of more than two weeks on average and less integral projects have an average 
time overrun of 11 months. Hypothesis 4 (Projects with more integral public-private 
partnerships will have less time overrun than projects with less integral public-private 
 More integral Less integral 
Average cost overrun between decision to 
build and route decision (Phase 1-2 ) 
10% 5% 
Average cost overrun between route decision 
and completion (Phase 2-3) 
-2% 8% 
Average cost overrun between decision to 
build and completion (Phase 1-3) 
8% 13% 
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partnerships) is confirmed, because more integral public-private partnerships have indeed less 
time overruns than less integral public-private partnerships. 
 
4.3 Results within-case analysis 
4.3.1 Introduction  
In this paragraph the results of the within-case analysis are presented. Firstly, some 
general information about the Dutch institutional context is described in order to understand 
the Dutch approach of infrastructure projects. As discussed in section 3.5.3 this information is 
acquired from several informants working for Rijkswaterstaat. Secondly, for each project the 
main characteristics and the main mechanisms behind cost and time overruns are described. 
As mentioned in section 3.5.4 this information is acquired from interviews with members of 
the Rijkswaterstaat project team and from documentation about the projects.  
4.3.2 Institutional context 
 In the Netherlands, all national infrastructure projects are planned in the 
‘Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport’. This is a public document 
conducted by the Department of Infrastructure and Environment. The idea behind this 
documentation is conducting a transparent process for the provision of infrastructure (MIRT-
programmaboek, bla). Moreover, national governmental contributions to infrastructure 
projects come from a infrastructure fund. The rationale behind the fund is a constant flow of 
new projects. The Department of Infrastructure and Environment is responsible for the 
exploration and initiation phase, together with local governments.  
Once the decision is made to execute the project, the responsibility is transferred to the 
governmental agency Rijkswaterstaat. Rijkswaterstaat executes all national water and road 
construction projects. Once a project arrives at Rijkswaterstaat, a project team makes a 
procurement plan. The choice for a contract type is made here. Internal cost experts make a 
project estimation and a contract estimation. With a final procurement plan, the procurement 
section of Rijkswaterstaat starts with the tendering process. Private parties can do a bid for the 
contract. The three best bids are chosen to do a ‘dialogue focused on competition’. The 
private parties have to elaborate on their bid with plans on safety, design, environment and 
innovation. After an intensive tendering process one private party is chosen to execute the 
project. Alongside the tender the Rijkswaterstaat project team starts with several procedures. 
The budgets and execution agreements with the regional stakeholders need to be formalized, 
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all building plots need to be purchased and the route decision need to be final. Ideally, these 
procedures are finished before the contract is signed with the private party.  
Execution agreements with regional stakeholders contain information about the 
connection of the motorway with regional roads, additions to the project demanded by the 
regional stakeholder and agreements about nuisance of the project. Most execution 
agreements have a high abstraction level, what means that specific fulfillment of extra wishes 
is possible in a later stadium of the project. The purchasing of building plots is a process of 
negotiations with the owners of the building plots. Sometimes the owner is not willing to sell 
the building plot. Than the last resort is an expropriation procedure, in which the owners are 
forced to sell the building plots. The route decision procedure concerns the spatial integration 
of the project. All sorts of entities are able to submit amendments to the route decision. In 
most cases residents and environmental organizations are the claimants. Amendments can be 
submitted at the ‘Raad van State’, the highest administrative court in the Netherlands. When 
the Raad van State cancels the route decision, a new route decision need to be created.  
 
4.3.3 Case A15 Maasvlakte Vaanplein 
Project characteristics  
The project A15 Maasvlakte to Vaanplein is a solution for the growing traffic stream 
from the newest part of the Rotterdam mainport, the Maasvlakte, to the mainland of the 
Netherlands (Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 2014: 153). It is a renovation of the 
existing two lane motorway and an expansion of a third lane over 36 kilometers. Special civil 
work of this project is the new Botlek bridge, which is new bridge combined with a railway.  
Cost and time overrun  
 Reasons for cost overrun were additional wishes from the region, price indexing and 
additional costs for the claims. The most cost overruns occurred in the pre-construction phase 
of the project. During the construction phase, the project had minimal cost overruns. 
However, there were some claim situations with the contractor. The project team reserved 
enough budget to limit the cost and time overruns. 
Cooperation  
The relations between contractor and clients was not perfect. According to the project 
manager this difficult relation was due to a strategy of both sides of the project. The private 
party was confident to take risks from the government. One of the risks they took, was 
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consultation and contact with the regional stakeholders. This task was hard to conduct for the 
contractor. On the other hand, the government did not intervene when it went wrong. Initially, 
the project team applied the Bahama model. This entails that the contractor takes all the risks 
and the governmental organization Rijkswaterstaat does not play a significant role in the 
project.  This resulted in problems during the execution of the project, that could not be 
resolved in time. Some disputes with the contractor resulted in legal claims. Lawsuits were 
started due to disputes about deadlines, unclear demands in the contract and unbearable risks 
for the contractor.  
The cooperation between the government and the private sector during this project was 
not based on mutual interest. The cooperation with the counterpart was worse. The 
explanation for the worse cooperation were personnel changes and an uncommunicative 
attitude of both sides.  
Contract 
 The project and contract size for this project is considered as too voluminous. It was 
hard to estimate the complexity of the Botlek bridge, because it was part of the whole project. 
When the Botlek bridge was tendered in separate contract, the design and technical 
implications of the bridge would have been studies more comprehensive.  
The pressure on the cooperation was increased because of the DBFM contract. With 
this DBFM contract there was much pressure on the planning of the project, due to the interest 
of the financers in the consortium. A D&C contract has more space for deadline extensions, 
because the financing is done by the government itself.  
4.3.4 Case A12 Lunetten Veenendaal 
Project characteristics  
 The project A12 Lunetten Veenendaal contained an expansion of an existing 
motorway from Utrecht to the east. The first 8 kilometers are renovated and expanded with a 
fourth lane and a remaining 20 kilometers are renovated and expanded with a third lane. 
Three eco and fauna passages are included in the project as well. The total construction 
budget is around 380 million euros. The project was not complex from a technical prospect. 
The regional stakeholders made it more complex with additional wishes.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The general image of the cost development of this project is positive. Most extra costs 
were covered by the reservation for unforeseen costs. The contractor’s bid was significantly 
lower than the contract estimate by Rijkswaterstaat. Some events resulted in extra costs.  
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The fact that the project was not technically complex, resulted in a nearly spotless 
execution of the project. There was only a problem with the acquisition of building plots. 
Some building plots were not available at the start of the construction phase. This is a result of 
interference of several procedures. The acquisition of building plots took place at the same 
time as the tendering procedure. This resulted in extra costs, because the contractor was not 
able to start with all project parts. However, those extra costs were covered with the budget 
reservation for unforeseen costs.  
Another problem with regard to cost overruns were execution agreements with the 
regional stakeholders. The agreements were too abstract. Further completion of the 
agreements resulted in some extra wishes and extra budget was needed. For some extra 
wishes the regional stakeholders were financially responsible. Some changes is paid for by 
Rijkswaterstaat. The project was completed six months earlier than the deadline. The reason 
for the early finishing was a bonus in the contract. 
Cooperation  
 The cooperation between Rijkswaterstaat and the contractor was good. Both the 
Rijkswaterstaat project team and the contractor’s project team were motivated to cooperate 
and make the project a success, which created a positive vibe during the project. The 
contractor has met the expectations from the tendering process. During the execution of the 
project there were no significant inconveniences. The project team helped the contractor with 
some issues with regional stakeholders, while this was the risk of the contractor. This created 
trust between Rijkswaterstaat and the contractor. The contractor did not delay the project with 
claim situations.  
Contract 
 This project is contracted with a DBFM contract. DBFM is known for its stringent 
steering on project deadlines. However, stringent deadlines are possible with D&C contracts 
as well. The only difference during this project is the maintenance component. Integrating the 
M-component in the contract resulted in some innovations implemented by the contractor in 
order to enhance the life cycle of the project. One example is the usage of rejuvenation crème 
for the asphalt to extend the life cycle of the asphalt.   
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4.3.5 Case A12 Ede Grijsoord 
Project characteristics  
The project A12 Ede Grijsoord contained a renovation of a motorway with a length of 
11 kilometers and expansion with a third lane. The maintenance part is extended with 8 
kilometers from the project  A12 Veenendaal Ede. The maintenance period lasts until 2032. 
The total construction budget is around 120 million euros. The project was technically not 
complex. The stakeholder complexity was average.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The general image of the cost development for this project is good. The percentage of 
extra work is remarkably low. For this project the contractor’s bid was significantly lower 
than the contract estimate by Rijkswaterstaat. The contractor has made some requests for 
extra budget, but due to the clear risk distribution most of those costs were paid by the 
contractor. In the end, the project was finished half a year earlier than the deadline. An early 
completion was possible thanks to the positive cooperation between the contractor and 
Rijkswaterstaat.  
Cooperation  
The cooperation between the contractor and Rijkswaterstaat was good. The project 
team helped the contractor by extending the time windows for the contractor to work on the 
project. This is an example where the project team helps the contractor without the use of 
extra budget. With wider time windows the contractor can make longer days and works more 
efficiently. This helped in the cooperation with the contractor.   
Initially, the start of the tendering process was delayed. At first, it was a 
disappointment for the project team. However, it gave the possibility to optimize the 
documents for tendering and the agreements with regional stakeholders. When the contract 
was awarded, all agreements with the regional stakeholders were negotiated and the contract 
documents were of good quality. This resulted in a smooth realization phase with the 
contractor and the regional stakeholders. The contractor did not delay the process and kept to 
all what was promised during the tendering process.  
Contract 
 For this project a DBFM contract worked well, because two conditions are met. First, 
the environment was not complex. The stakeholders were cooperative and the project did not 
have a major impact on the environment. Second, the project team was prepared. It was the 
challenge to avoid any occasion for the contractor to debate the contract or to create a claim 
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situation. When the project team is organized well and causes no delay, any delay is the 
responsibility of the contractor.  
 When the project team is well prepared with DBFM, the power in the relationship with 
the contractor lies with Rijkswaterstaat. The contractor has to deal with strict deadlines and 
payment criteria. The project team can decide whether to impose fines. Another positive 
effect of this project was the size of the contract. This project was manageable, due to its 
moderate size.  
4.3.6 Case A4 Dinteloord Bergen op Zoom 
Project characteristics  
 The project A4 Dinteloord Bergen op Zoom is a complete new motorway between 
Dinteloord and Bergen op Zoom with a length of 14 kilometers. Part is an upgrade of the 
existing provincial road, part is a new road through virginal area. The total budget is around 
250 million euros, with a large contribution of the region.  
Cost and time overrun 
The project started with a much lower bid than was estimated by Rijkswaterstaat. The 
gap between the contract estimate and the contractor’s bid was reserved as budget for 
unexpected costs, because this project was part of a pilot. The tendering process was started 
before the official route decision was established. The draft route decision was the basis for 
the project. A part of the route decision was annulled based on local resident’s protests. For 
that part Rijkswaterstaat opted for a completely different route, while the contract was already 
signed. This resulted in delay and amendments in the contract.  
Additional wishes from the region were another cause of project changes. 
Rijkswaterstaat reserved budget for a bridge, but the region wanted an aqueduct. With a small 
regional contribution it was possible to implement the aqueduct. In the end, the project budget 
was sufficient. All changes were captured with the reservation for unexpected costs.  
The project is delayed with almost a year. The delay was caused by the annulled route 
decision. A new consultation of stakeholders was needed and ultimately it was impossible to 
prevent a delay.  
Cooperation 
 During the project the cooperation between the contractor and Rijkswaterstaat was not 
smooth. The contractor was not willing to catch up the delay. The project team at the 
contractor’s side was not stable. Personnel changes had a worse effect on the cooperation. The 
contractor’s company was acquired by another company and resulted in even more personnel 
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changes. Both parties were not sufficiently transparent. In the end, the contractor has met the 
minimal expectations of the project team.  
Contract 
 Retrospectively, the choice for a D&C contract was right, because of the pilot with the 
route decision. With a D&C contract, there is more discretionary space for the project team to 
delay the deadlines. A DBFM contract would have resulted in high claims from the contractor 
because of the delay caused by Rijkswaterstaat.  
4.3.7 Case A4 Delft Schiedam 
Project characteristics  
 The project A4 Delft Schiedam is a completely new six lane motorway of nine 
kilometers between The Hague and Rotterdam. The project has a long history. In the 1950’s 
the first plans were made to create the new motorway. The project budget was around 700 
million euros. A 2 kilometers long land tunnel, 1,4 kilometers deepened located motorway, 
2,6 kilometers half deepened located motorway and a eco aqueduct made the project 
technically complex.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The contractor’s bid was significantly lower than the contract estimation by 
Rijkswaterstaat. The positive tender result had two reasons. First, the contractor had some 
innovative elements incorporated, so that the project could be executed more efficient. 
Second, some wishes from Rijkswaterstaat were not properly translated into the contract. 
 Finally, the project budget was sufficient. Some contract changes were unavoidable. 
An innovative recycling of civil works was impossible after the implementation of new 
regulations during the project execution.  
 At first, the project would have had a delay of one year with the original planning. 
However, after a renegotiation with the contractor, the original date of opening could be 
accomplished.  
Cooperation  
 In the beginning of the project, the cooperation between Rijkswaterstaat and the 
contractor was poor. The cooperation started with many discussions about project changes 
and contract interpretations. At some point, the project managers from both sides decided to 
change the cooperation. The original date of opening became most important and financial 
settlement was a problem for after the opening. At that moment both sides found a collective 
goal. More delay would have resulted in negative consequences for both the contractor as 
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Rijkswaterstaat. This new form of cooperation was a pleasant experience for both sides of the 
contract. It was a cooperation based on trust. Trust from the Rijkswaterstaat project team that 
the contractor would do everything to complete the project in time and trust from the 
contractor that all additional work would be rewarded afterwards. Contract changes and 
meetings were more efficient, because of better time management and increased cooperation. 
Contract  
 The project was realized with a D&C contract. The D&C contract was not the 
motivation to choose for the fresh start, because there were no strong incentives in the 
contract to force the contractor to complete the project in time. The costs for running both 
organizations were the motivation. Especially the size of the contract was the cause of the 
problems with managing the contract.  
4.3.8 Case A10 Oost Amsterdam 
Project characteristics  
 The project ‘A10 Oost’ is part of the contract cluster ‘Schiphol-Amsterdam-Almere’ 
(SAA). This project is the first and smallest project of SAA. This project is a part of the Ring 
of Amsterdam. It is a renovation of existing 5,5 kilometers of the A10 Oost, a renovation of 
3,5 kilometers A1 and an expansion of a fourth lane of 3,5 kilometers at A10 Oost. Large part 
of the project were new noise barriers. The project budget was around 150 million euros.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The project started with a large positive tendering result. With the start of the project, 
the first contract change was needed. The internal Rijkswaterstaat organization demanded 
higher noise barriers. The contractor’s designing process already started. Because of the extra 
wishes and the subsequent delay, the contractor successfully demanded extra budget, because 
Rijkswaterstaat was responsible for the alternation. Some more contract changes occurred. 
Some wishes were poorly translated in contractual terms. All changes could have been paid 
from the initial project budget. The problems around the noise barriers resulted in project 
delay. It was not possible to catch up the delay during the project, resulting in a time overrun 
of one year. 
Cooperation  
 First, the cooperation between Rijkswaterstaat and the contractor was poor, because of 
the major contract change. Some personnel changes were made, in order to restore the trust 
between both parties. The fresh start resulted in a better cooperation. The contractor kept his 
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promises about the project approach. Despite the major delay, the contractor created a high 
quality motorway and did not create more delays with the claim situation.  
Contract  
 There were some problems with the completeness of the contract. The project was 
realized with a D&C contract. The changes with the noise barriers would be more expensive 
with a DBFM contract. The initial opening date would probably not have been accomplished 
with a DBFM.  
4.3.9 Case A4 Burgerveen Leiden 
Project characteristics  
 The project A4 Burgerveen Leiden is a renovation of the existing 12 kilomters 
motorway and an expansion with a third lane over 12 kilometers. Special about this project is 
a deepened located part of 1,4 kilometers around Leiderdorp including a aqueduct and 
reservation for a fourth lane, a deepened located part under the HSL south and a aqueduct 
under the Ringvaart. The budget for this project was around 600 million euros.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The contractor’s bid was lower than was estimated by Rijkswaterstaat. The positive 
tendering result around 200 million euros remained in the project, because possible risks 
during the execution of the project. The route decision was annulled, which resulted in a 
project delay. First, the contractor wanted to dissolve the contract. Dissolving is possible 
when the delay is more than half a year. The goal of the project team was to keep the 
contractor on board. The contractor wanted compensation for the costs of the project 
organization during the delay.   
During the realization problems occurred with the deepened located part of the route, 
which resulted in delay and extra costs. The additional cost for the southern part of the route, 
the deepened located motorway, were threefold. The municipality of Leiderdorp had some 
additional wishes, the contractor faced some problems with an innovative construction 
technique during the execution and new regulations had to be implemented in the project. The 
extra costs were covered with the reserved budget for unexpected costs. In the end, the project 
budget was broadly sufficient. A part of the project budget was unused and has been returned 
to Rijkswaterstaat. 
Cooperation  
 The relation with the contractor was good. At first, the contractor wanted to leave the 
project. That situation resulted in a negative atmosphere between both project teams. The 
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terms of the contract needed to be renegotiated. After renegotiations, the contractor was 
willing to cooperate and complete the project and the relation was restored. The quality 
assurance system functioned properly and problems from both sides were communicated on 
time. In that sense, the contractor executed the project as was promised during the tendering 
process and the cooperation between both sides was professional.  
Contract  
 This project is realized with a D&C contract. With this contract the transfer from the 
contractor to the operator was not smooth. It was a hard transition. With new D&C contracts a 
smooth transfer of the project is implemented in the contract. With a DBFM this problem 
would not occur, because the private party is responsible for the maintenance as well.  
 Another factor with DBFM is that changes in the project from client’s side are more 
expensive. With this project, the regional stakeholders and Rijkswaterstaat wanted to change 
too much during the realization. Changes in the project are cheaper with D&C contracts.  
 
4.3.10 Case N31 Leeuwarden 
Project characteristics  
 The project N31 Leeuwarden is a new 12,5 kilometers long motorway on the south of 
Leeuwarden to take away the through traffic from the city and construct a new ring. Part of 
the project is executed by the province of Friesland commissioned by Rijkswaterstaat and part 
of the project is solely executed by Rijkswaterstaat. Part of the project are several bridges, 
viaducts and one aqueduct. The total budget for the project is 250 million euros.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The project started with some personnel problems. It was hard to find a good project 
team for Rijkswaterstaat. External hired personnel was more expensive. Moreover, there was 
not enough budget for the project team to control the project part of the province. During the 
execution, there were some setbacks. First, there occurred some problems with the appliance 
of permits. The apply was rejected and the project got some delay. The contractor wanted 
compensation for the delay. After the compensation, all of the project budget was used. 
Second, during the tendering the project team made wrong assumptions about the water level. 
The water level was more volatile than assumed. The contractor designed the motorway based 
on a fixed water level based on the contractual terms. A contract change had to be 
renegotiated with the contractor. The project budget was insufficient, so the project team 
needed 13 million euros extra budget. Both situations resulted in delay of the project.  
Cooperation  
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 The cooperation with the contractor was poor. The contractor’s project team had no 
feeling with the unique DNA of the project. The contractor wanted to create distance with the 
contract team of Rijkswaterstaat. Because of the sharp bid of the contractor, the project was 
unprofitable for the contractor and the contractor used every occasion to create additional 
work and to impose claims. The contractor did not communicate with the project team about 
problems and losses on the project and imposed claims without warning.  
At one point, the contractor’s quality assessment systems did not work. Since this is a 
contractual obligation, Rijkswaterstaat paused the project and imposed a fine on the 
contractor. On that field, the contractor did not achieve as was promised during the tender.  
Contract 
 Several contracts are used for this project. The 4,5 kilometers executed by the 
Province are separated in five contracts and the 8 kilometers executed by Rijkswaterstaat is 
executed with one D&C contract.  
4.3.11 Case A9 Badhoevedorp 
Project characteristics  
 The project A9 Badhoevedorp contained the construction of a completely rerouting of 
the 4 kilometers long motorway outside Badhoevedorp and the demolition of the old 
motorway, which leads through the village of Badhoevedorp.  The budget for the project is 
around 300 million euros with a large contribution of the municipality of Badhoevedorp.  
 Cost and time overrun  
 The development of the project budget was as expected. The project started with a 
positive tendering result. Some unexpected costs and additional work is done by the 
contractor. In the end, the project had still some reserves. Additional wishes and changes by 
the region were a disturbing factor during the realization of the project. The regional 
stakeholders demanded changes. These changes to the project were unavoidable. The 
contractor imposed a claim because of the many disturbances.  
 The contractor finished a few months earlier, because of innovative project 
management. The project planning was copied on the walls of the project office. All events 
during the project were symbolized with a post-it, which increased the overview of the project 
and time efficiency of the contractor. The contractor uses the last months to sell parts of the 
old motorway. The contractor can wait for the right moment to sell the old noise barriers, the 
sand and the asphalt. This was an incentive to open the motorway earlier.  
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Cooperation  
 The cooperation was good. The cooperation did reach a critical point; due to the 
presence of WWII bombshells, the risk arose, that the project had to be shut down. After 
much discussion, the contractor and Rijkswaterstaat found a solution and the project 
continued. The only frustration of the project team was the ongoing discussion of the 
contractor about many details. Apart from the frustration, the contractor completed the project 
as promised and the quality of the project was high.  
Contract  
 The project is realized with a D&C contract. The contract did not contain incentives to 
open the motorway earlier, but the incentive of lower project costs and higher profits on the 
selling process of the old motorway were enough. The contractor used an innovative way of 
asphalt recycling. This innovative solution was possible, because of the integration of the 
design and construct components.  
4.3.12 Case A50 Ewijk Valburg 
Project characteristics  
 The project A50 Ewijk Valburg contained the construction of an extra bridge of the 
Waal, the renovation of the existing lanes and the expansion of a third and fourth lane over a 
length of almost ten kilometers. The project budget is around 270 million euros. The inclusion 
of the bridge increased the complexity of the project.  
 Cost and time overrun  
 Initially, the project team was worried about the project budget. Whether it was 
enough. In the end the project budget was sufficient. There were little contract changes and 
requests for additional work.  
 The project had some delay around the construction of the new bridge. The new bridge 
was located next to the existing one. The contractor had the responsibility to monitor the 
safety around the bridge, because there was still traffic on the old bridge. The contractor took 
too much risk in the perception of Rijkswaterstaat. The project team intervened and shut down 
the project. When the safety was restored, it took a month for the contractor to restart the 
project, which resulted in some delay.  
 The greatest part of the delay was caused by another project: the renovation of the 
existing bridge over the Waal. Simultaneously the project team found out that the construction 
of the new bridge took more time for the contractor. There both project teams found common 
ground and negotiated an intentional delay. It was a relief for both sides of the contract. The 
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contractor did not send a claim and the Rijkswaterstaat project team did not oppose fines for 
the delay.  
Cooperation  
 The cooperation with the contractor was good. The contractor took ownership in the 
project, informed the Rijkswaterstaat project team and delivered high quality. Both teams 
experienced a positive atmosphere during the project. The contractor did not take each 
opportunity to discuss contract changes. The cooperation was the fundament for the 
negotiations for the shift of the project deadline. The only negative experience with the 
contractor was the problem with the safety at the bridge. 
Contract  
 The project was realized with a D&C contract. The delay of the project was probably 
not possible if the project was realized with a DBFM contract, because of the pressure of the 
financiers.  
4.3.13 N35 Combiplan Nijverdal 
Project characteristics  
 The project N35 Combiplan Nijverdal contained a renovation of an existing regional 
road with the possibility to make an upgrade to a four lane motorway and a tunnel in the 
center of Nijverdal. The tunnel is combined with a railway station. The total budget for the 
project was around 300 million euros. The tunnel was technically complex.  
Cost and time overrun  
 The project had an enormous cost overrun. There are several reasons for the budget 
overruns. Firstly, the railway station of Nijverdal is added to the tunnel. Secondly, there were 
some additional wishes from the region. The wishes are largely paid by the regional 
stakeholders. Thirdly, the project team made a decision to implement the new tunnel 
regulations to the project. Fourthly, the minister and the region decided that the project team 
had to construct the tunnel and some bridges with a reservation for an expansion of an extra 
lane. For those changes, a new revenue model for the contractor was negotiated. Afterwards 
that model was a little royal for the contractor, but the project team had no other choice. After 
the restart, the regulations for tunnels revised. The revision resulted in extra costs and extra 
budget was required. 
 In 2011 the project team on both sides experienced personnel changes. Many of the 
abovementioned changes were not formalized by the project team. After formalizing, the 
required project budget almost doubled in size. The formalizing was a new start of the project. 
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The deadline for the opening of the project shifted to a year later. In the last stages of the 
project, the tunnel testing caused some extra delay. Most of the delay and extra budget was 
result of the implementation of the new tunnel regulations. 
Cooperation  
 Unless the delay and many contract changes, the cooperation with the contractor was 
good. For the restart of the project, the contractor had a different vision on the continuing of 
the project. However, both parties had the intention to continue the project. The contractor 
had to deal with a demanding client and was pro-active when problems occurred on the side 
of Rijkswaterstaat.   
 The construction site of the tunnel was a complex piece of construction with a lot of 
different construction companies in which the contractor had a coordinating role. There were 
contractors of ProRail, contractors of regional stakeholders and subcontractors for their own 
project. That coordinating role was executed very well by the contractor. The contractor has 
met the expectations about the quality and cooperation during the project.  
Contract  
The project was realized with a D&C contract. In this case a DBFM was no option, 
because of the uncertainty around the new tunnel regulations.  
 
4.4 Cross-case analysis and in-depth analysis combined 
4.4.1 Technical complexity 
 From the in-depth analysis of the projects one explanation for cost and time overruns 
is of interest: technical complexity. Many concerned project managers, contract managers and 
project controllers experienced problems with complex parts of the projects. In most cases the 
problems were about tunnels and in some cases with bridges. The projects with high technical 
complexity have one aspect in common: the technical part of the project was not implemented 
before. For A15 Maasvlakte Vaanplein it was the Botlek bridge, for N35 Combiplan Nijverdal 
it was a tunnel combined with a railroad station, for A4 Burgerveen Leiden it was a tunnel 
combined with a aqueduct, for A10 Amsterdam Second Coentunnel it was a new tunnel next 
to an existing tunnel, for A4 Delft Schiedam it was a landtunnel combined with a deepened 
motorway and for A2 Maastricht it was a two layers tunnel. Most of these projects had severe 
cost and time overruns.  
 Table 10 presents all projects and their overruns selected on technical complexity. The 
average cost overrun for technical complex projects is on average higher than the cost overrun 
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for projects with low technical complexity. There is a reasonable difference in time overrun as 
well. For this population, projects with more technical complexity have higher cost and time 
overruns.  
The explanations of cost and time overrun as result of technical complexity have 
different causes. Time overruns can be the responsibility of both the contractor and the client. 
When it is the contractor’s responsibility, the contractor probably made a miscalculation about 
the construction time or the implications of the contractual terms of the technical component. 
When this occurs, the possible costs are mostly for the contractor. In some cases 
Rijkswaterstaat did not properly define what they want in the contract (A15 Maasvlakte 
Vaanplein) or Rijkswaterstaat had additional wishes about the technical complex part of the 
project (N35 Combiplan Nijverdal). These situations can result in both cost and time 
overruns. However, in most cases there is no sole responsible actor, because it is simply 
impossible to estimate the costs of unique technical complex part of a project. In those cases 
Rijkswaterstaat and the contractor take the responsibility together. The main problem is the 
difficulty to estimate the costs for the technical component, because it has a unique character. 
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Table 10: Cost and time overrun for all projects divided on technical complexity 
Route   Technical 
complexity 
Total cost 
overrun 
Cost overrun 
realization 
Time 
overrun 
A4 Delft Schiedam 4/5 1% 5% 0 months 
A2 Maastricht Passage 4/5 31% 18% 0 months 
A4  Burgerveen Leiden 4/5 -7% -6% 38 months 
N35 Zwolle Almelo 4/5 77% 50% 20 months 
A15 Maasvlakte Vaanplein 4/5 23% 1% 6 months 
A10/A5 Amsterdam 2
nd
 Coentun. 4/5 14% 8% 3 months 
Total     23% 13% 11 months 
A4 Dinteloord Bergen op 
Zoom 
3/5 21% -5% 11 months 
N31 Leeuwarden Leeuwarden 3/5 20% 19% 0 months 
A50 Ewijk  Valburg 3/5 2% 3% 36 months 
Total    14% 6% 16 months 
A9 Badhoevedorp Omlegging 2/5 1% -2% -6 months 
N61 Hoek Schoondijke 2/5 8% 5% 3 months 
A10/A1 Amstel Diemen 2/5 -24% -7% 7.5 months 
A12 Lunetten Veenendaal 2/5 -4% 3% -6 months 
A12 Ede Grijsoord 2/5 -13% -14% -6 months 
N33 Assen Zuidbroek 2/5 18% -9% 0 months 
Total    -2% -4% -1 months 
4.4.2 Delay as result of interwoven procedures 
For infrastructure projects some procedures are interwoven in order to limit the time 
consuming pre-construction phase of projects. Delay of one procedure could result in delay 
during the construction phase. Most of the procedures are the responsibility of 
Rijkswaterstaat. The most common delay is caused by an annulation of the route decision. 
When the route decision is annulled, a new route decision took at least six months for the 
projects A4 Burgerveen Leiden, A4 Dinteloord Bergen op Zoom and A10 Oost Amsterdam. 
The project delay meant a delay for the contractor as well. The costs of the contractor’s 
project organization are high. The contractor submits a claim for those costs which resulted in 
higher contract costs than estimated. Moreover, the delay as result of the route decision results 
in delay for the project. When the delay is not recovered in the remaining of the project, time 
overruns occur. Another problem is the purchasing of building plots. For some projects the 
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building plots were not available in time for the contractor. When a necessary building plot is 
not available in time, the contractor is not able to start the project. Again, the contractor can 
submit a claim for the delay and the project be confronted with time overruns. The use of 
interwoven procedures is avoided with the use of integral contracts, because the risks of 
signing a DBFM contract without a definitive scope was risky. 
Interwoven procedures are result of initiatives to limit the pre-construction time. If all 
procedures need to be finished before the tendering process starts, projects will have a much 
longer passing time. The costs for Rijkswaterstaat increase, because project teams are 
involved for a longer period of time. On the other hand, signing the contract with the private 
party before all administrative procedures are finished bears some risks.  
4.4.3 Extra wishes during project 
 A recurring explanation for extra project costs is the demand for implementing extra 
wishes. Mostly regional stakeholders demand for amendments on the project, but sometimes 
Rijkswaterstaat, the Department of Infrastructure and Environment or the National Parliament 
have extra wishes for a project. With the start of the project those changes were no part of the 
project. Each project has to deal with those extra wishes. The wishes from regional 
stakeholders are limited. Mostly the wishes are a bicycle tunnel or a better connection with 
regional infrastructure. Wishes from within Rijkswaterstaat and the department have more 
impact. These situations occurred only for a few projects.   
4.4.4 Cooperation 
 During the construction phase the cooperation between the contractor’s project team 
and Rijkswaterstaat’s project team varied. For all projects count that the contractor executed 
what was promised during the tendering process. The contractual obligations have been met 
by the contractor. However, with some projects the contractor was willing to do only the 
minimum. Contractual changes, extra wishes or ambiguities in the contract were a possibility 
for the contractor to complain, impose claims or ask high prices for extra work. In other 
words, the contractor was not cooperative with these issues. The explanations for self-
interested behavior of the contractor varies. The Rijkswaterstaat project teams had some 
ideas, but they were not certain. With some projects the contractor had the mission to make 
the project profitable for the contractor by finding ambiguities and wrong contractual terms in 
order to create extra work. In those cases the contractor followed its self-interest. When a 
project is loss-making, the contractor’s project team has the task to create extra work and 
impose claims in order to make profits. For some projects the contractor got tired of the 
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contractual amendments. In that cases the contractor chose its own interest above the shared 
interest. This counted for four of the eleven in-depth cases. For seven of the eleven cases the 
cooperation was good. The contractor was willing to cooperate when problems occurred. 
Even when the problem was the responsibility of Rijkswaterstaat.  
4.4.5 Contract type 
The projects differed on contract type. The least integral projects used a D&C contract. 
This contract is based on the same judicial contracting methodology. The contracts are mostly 
outcome based. In order to measure behavior during the execution of the contract, the 
contractor need to measure its own quality. The controlling for the contractor’s quality 
systems is necessary, because with each project there is a small outcome uncertainty. For 
Rijkswaterstaat it is desirable to know if the project is on schedule and what plans the 
contractor has to stay on schedule. With some projects Rijkswaterstaat pauses the project until 
the contractor repaired the quality systems (see section 4.3.10). Rijkswaterstaat can impose 
fines when the quality system of the contractor is not working. The contracts are outcome 
based, because quality of the outcome is easily measurable. With outcome based contracts, 
adverse selection was successfully avoided. Many project team members stated that the 
contractors wanted to realize high quality projects and with all projects the contractor was 
able to deliver all contractual obligations. Moreover, the contractors are tested during the 
tendering phase on the quality they have delivered and are willing to deliver.  
During the construction phase the project managers, contract managers and project 
controllers had different experiences with contract types and the degree of integrality. With 
more integral projects it is more difficult to change contractual terms and change the scope of 
the project. This is the possible explanation for the cost underrun of more integral projects 
during the construction phase. The cost overrun occurred during the pre-construction phase, 
because execution agreements and contractual issues were dealt with before the execution of 
the project started. This approach demands much discipline from both contract teams before 
the project starts.  
On the other hand, the price for contractual changes seems higher for more integral 
contracts. The reason for the higher price is the relatively high costs for the contractor. The 
contractor need to change terms with the financiers within the consortium, which result in 
additional costs. With less integral contracts it is possible to agree on some delay. However, 
with more integral contracts the planning is crucial. More integral projects are on tight 
schedule and changes in the planning cannot be negotiated between contractor and client 
alone. The contractor need to renegotiate with the financiers as well.  
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 With more integral contracts it seems easier to avoid contractual changes as result of 
exogenous influences. For instance, extra wishes from the client, extra wishes from regional 
stakeholders or extra work proposed by the contractor. When a contractual disagreement 
occurs as result of unforeseen circumstances or wrong contractual terms by the client, more 
integral projects are more expensive than less integral contracts. 
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A15 MV 4/5 4/5 +500 23.2% 1.1% 22.1% 6  DBFM 6/10 
A12 LV  2/5 3/5 -500 -3.5% 2.6% -6.1% No DBFM 9/10 
A12 EG  2/5 2/5 -500 -13.1% -14.4% 1.3% No DBFM 8/10 
A10 Am  4/5 4/5 +500 13.9% 8.4% 5.5% 3 DBFM - 
N33 AZ 2/5 3/5 -500 18.4% -8.7% 27.1% No DBFM - 
A4 DB 3/5 4/5 -500 21.3% -4.7% 26% 11 D&C 6/10 
A4 DS 4/5 4/5 +500 0.6% 4.7% -4.1% No D&C 8/10 
A2 Ma 4/5 4/5 +500 30.5% 18.2% 12.3% No D&C - 
A10 AD 2/5 4/5 -500 -23.6% -6.8% -16.8% 7.5 D&C 7/10 
A4 BL 4/5 4/5 +500 -6.8% -5.7% -1.1% 38 D&C 8/10 
N31 Le 3/5 3/5 -500 20.1% 18.6% 1.5% No D&C 4/10 
A9 Ba 2/5 4/5 -500 1.2% -1.8% 3% No D&C 7/10 
A50 EV 3/5 2/5 -500 1.9% 2.7% -0.8% 36 D&C 8/10 
N61 HS 2/5 2/5 -500 7.8% 4.6% 3.2% 3 D&C - 
N35 ZA 4/5 3/5 -500 77.1% 49.9% 27.2% 20 D&C 7/10 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusions  
The central research question of this study is: How do more integral public-private 
partnerships (DBFM) perform with regard to cost and time overruns compared with less 
integral public-private partnerships (D&C) in the road construction sector? 
 There are some differences between more and less integral road construction projects 
in the Netherlands. The most clear difference between both groups of projects is the 
difference in time overrun. More integral projects have – on average – a small time underrun, 
which means that the projects are on average earlier opened than was estimated before 
execution. Two DBFM-projects had a severe time underrun, one was on schedule and two had 
a small time overrun. On the other hand, less integral projects have a large time overrun. A 
less integral project is on average opened 11 months later than was estimated before the start 
of the project. One D&C project had a time underrun, three were on schedule and seven 
projects had time overruns. On the comparison of time overrun, there is a significant 
difference between more integral and less integral public-private partnerships.  
  From the in-depth case analysis an explanation for this difference is found. With more 
integral contracts the contractor is responsible for the finance-component as well. The 
motivation for the contractor to finish the project on time is not solely based on extra 
organization costs when the project delays. The pressure from the financiers within the project 
is an extra drive to finish the project on time. Delay will result in extra interest costs and fines 
from the financiers. More integral public-private partnerships perform better than less integral 
public-private partnerships.  
 When it comes to cost overruns the more integral public-private partnerships achieve 
better on average. The cost overrun between the formal decision to build and the end of the 
construction phase for more integral public-private partnerships is 8 percent and for less 
integral public-private partnerships is 13 percent. The more integral public-private 
partnerships perform in line with Dutch road construction projects from before 2012. Most of 
the less integral projects do perform in line with the projects form before 2012.  
Another difference between more and less integral public-private partnerships is the 
development of the cost overruns. For more integral projects, most of the cost overrun occurs 
in the planning study phase. During the construction phase the costs overrun a little or the 
costs underrun the original budget. The explanation for this phenomenon is the notion that 
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small changes in the contracts between client and contractor relatively expensive with more 
integral contracts. Those small changes are avoided by the project team. Less integral projects 
have higher cost overruns during the construction phase, but relatively small cost overruns in 
the pre-construction phase. The higher cost overruns during the construction phase for less 
integral contracts are partly explainable with interwoven procedures during the planning study 
phase. In some cases the contract was signed, but the route decision was not final. An 
annulation of the route design is followed by a new procedure for a new route decision. This 
new procedure delayed the project and the contractor started a claim procedure. This form of 
interwoven procedures only occurred with less integral projects. In many cases this 
phenomenon resulted in cost and time overruns. 
Technical complexity is an explanation for cost and time overruns. Especially during 
the construction phase technically complex projects have larger time and cost overruns. For 
both the contractor and Rijkswaterstaat it is hard to estimate the costs and the construction 
time of a unique, technically complex part of a project. 
All in all, the more integral public-private partnerships performed better with regard to 
cost and time overrun. The evidence for the performance on time overrun is most convincing. 
For cost overrun the less integral projects performed on average better during the planning 
study phase. More integral projects performed better on cost overruns during the construction 
phase and for the overall cost overruns. 
 
5.2 Academic Implications 
5.2.1 Theories on cost and time overrun 
 The quantity of cost and time overruns and the size of the overruns is in line with 
existing academic work on this subject. The average cost overrun of 22.4 percent for road 
construction projects examined by Flyvbjerg (2002) is relatively high. However, Flyvbjerg 
did not mention what size the projects were in his sample. Cantarelli e.a. (2012b) followed the 
same tradition and found an average cost overrun of 18.6 percent road construction projects in 
the Netherlands. With an average cost overrun of 11 percent, the projects within this study 
follow the downward trend of cost overruns. Dutch road construction projects perform 
relatively good. 
 The quantity of time overruns for more integral projects does not fall in the empirical 
tradition of construction projects. On average those more integral projects have a time 
underrun, where most projects with less integral contracts are not on schedule. The 
explanation behind this success is the finance-component within the DBFM projects. Mostly 
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the finance for a DBFM projects is provided by several external financiers. The pressure of 
longer interest periods and fines for contractors is high. This pressure results in a drive for the 
contractor to finish the project on schedule.  
 The explanations for the overruns found with this study differ on some points with the 
existing literature on cost and time overruns. According to Flybjerg (2002) and Cantarelli e.a. 
(2012a) most cost overruns have political causes. When the causes of cost and time overruns 
were purely political, the overruns would have been equal distributed over the projects. 
However, technical complex projects have more cost and time overruns than the projects with 
low technical complexity. For projects with complex tunnels and bridges, much of the 
constructions are unique and especially the software and installations are unique. Both the 
governmental side as the private side do not exactly know what the project will cost. At some 
point during the tendering process the costs are determined. However, during the construction 
the costs increase, because of new technical standards, unforeseen parts of the project or 
miscalculations. Those explanations of cost and time overruns can be considered as technical 
explanations.  
 However, overruns still occurred at projects with low technical complexity. The 
technical explanation is not the only explanation. During most projects additional wishes were 
a cause of overruns. Additional wishes from the cliental side of the project or from external 
stakeholders. Those extra wishes are considered political explanations, because it is a political 
strategy to come up with project amendments during the construction phase. Another political 
explanation of the overruns is the decision to intertwine procedures in the pre-construction 
phase. With some projects the contract was signed before the route decision was formalized.  
5.2.2 Theories on principal agent theory 
 The DBFM contracts and D&C contracts are outcome based contracts. The contractor 
is assessed on the quality of the end result. With this method, adverse selection did not occur 
with these projects. For all projects count that the contractors delivered on their promises. For 
a client/contractor relationship it is desirable to use outcome based contracts to minimize the 
occurrence of adverse selection.  
However, moral hazard still occurred. Within a client/contractor relation it is hard to 
end the agency problem of moral hazard. Contractors still follow their self-interest in some 
cases. Outcome-based contracts are not sufficient to resolve the moral hazard problem within 
the infrastructure sector.  
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5.3 Practical Implications 
 DBFM projects have cost underruns during the construction phase. This means that 
once the scope is definitive, the project budgets do not overrun. For the same phase D&C 
projects have a cost overrun of eight percent. This means that for Rijkswaterstaat it seems that 
DBFM projects are easier to keep on budget than D&C projects. One possible explanation for 
the difference are interwoven procedures in the planning study phase.  Interwoven 
procedures can lead to cost and time overruns. For road infrastructure projects it is better to 
settle with a contractor when the scope is final and the official objection procedures with 
residents and regional stakeholders are finished. For more integral projects with DBFM 
contracts this strategy is followed. It is recommended for less integral projects to follow this 
strategy as well, because a new objection procedure could take up to a year. This delay is 
costly when the contract with the private party is already signed. The contractor will impose a 
claim because of the delay.  
 Technical complexity seems to have an association with cost and time overruns. The 
examined projects with high technical complexity have more cost and time overruns than the 
projects with low technical complexity. For policy makers it is of interest to decrease those 
overruns. Policy makers should give those technical components special interest during the 
tendering process. Maybe Rijkswaterstaat could ask a specific design of a complex tunnel or 
bridge. There will be more costs and time needed for the tendering process, but the harm of 
possible cost and time overruns is limited.   
 
5.4 Limitations 
 The research design has some limitations. For instance with the data reliability. When 
a contract change is demanded during the construction phase and the change is approved, the 
subsequent budget change is directly accounted for. These changes are included in this study. 
However, some contract changes as a result of conflicts or fines between contractor and client 
are not at this moment. These changes may influence the project budgets ex post. So the most 
recent project budgets for some projects may be influenced by those conflicts in the future.  
Moreover, infrastructure projects are unique and have a complex decision making 
process, with many factors that influence the project, the project scope and the project budget. 
It is hard to isolate the factors that determine the cost or time overrun. With the explored 
explanations, most parts of the cost and time overruns are covered. However, there is always a 
human factor in infrastructure projects which is hard to measure.  
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5.5 Further Research 
 For further research three possible paths are of interest. Firstly, this study can be 
expanded with more cases in the future. With more cases a statistical analysis is possible. 
Maybe there can be trends in cost and time overruns. The use of more integral contracts is 
relatively new in the Netherlands. Maybe the contracts perform better on overruns in the 
future. 
Secondly, in order to measure the effectiveness of integral contracts for infrastructure 
projects, the exploitation phase is of interest. With this research the pre-construction phase 
and the construction phase are studied. However, within 15 years it is possible to analyze the 
maintenance of a DBFM project with the maintenance of a D&C project. Especially the study 
for cost overruns is of interest in order to examine the efficiency of integral contracts in the 
long run.  
Thirdly, an international comparative study with a mixed population of more and less 
integral projects is interesting. Important for comparative research is the reliability of data. 
The data collection, case selection and measurement need to be similar for each project within 
the population. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Written part for the interviews 
 
Project: 
 
 
Functie: 
 
Contractvorm: 
 
Betrokken tijdens: 
O O O O O 
Voorbereiding 
aanbesteding 
Contract-fase Realisatie Oplevering Exploitatie 
 
Het cijfer voor de samenwerking met de private partij: 
O O O O O O O O O O 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
De verhouding tussen Rijkswaterstaat en de marktpartij(en) tijdens dit project was gebaseerd 
op gelijke belangen: 
O O O O O 
Geheel mee eens Mee eens Neutraal Mee oneens Geheel mee 
oneens 
 
Het doel voor de datum van openstelling dat bij aanvang van de bouw is gesteld werd 
gehaald: 
O O O 
Ja Nee Mij niet bekend 
 
Tijdens het project hebben we het projectbudget moeten aanpassen naar aanleiding van 
VTW’s: 
O O O 
Ja Nee Mij niet bekend 
 
De aanpassingen aan het projectbudget door VTW’s zijn te wijten aan: 
O O O O 
Rijkswaterstaat Private partij Niet duidelijk N.v.t. 
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Appendix 2: Table with information about conducted interviews with officials from 
Rijkswaterstaat and appendix 3: Table with information about conducted interviews with 
contract managers, project managers and project controllers are accessible by contacting 
the author of this study. 
 
